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Abstract 
What do state-owned enterprises (SOEs) do? How do they respond to market incentives? Can we expect 
substantial efficiency gains from trade liberalization in economies with a strong presence of SOEs? Using 
a new dataset of Vietnamese firms we document a set of empirical regularities distinguishing SOEs from 
private _rms. Then we empirically study the effect of the 2007 WTO accession on selection, competition, 
and productivity. Our results show that WTO entry is associated with higher probability of exit, lower firm 
profitability, and substantial increases in productivity for private firms but not for SOEs. Our estimates 
suggest that the overall productivity gains would have been about 40% larger in a counterfactual 
Vietnamese economy without SOEs. We highlight some economic mechanisms possibly driving these 
findings through the lenses of a model of trade with heterogeneous private and state-owned firms. The 
model suggests that political/regulatory barriers to entry and access to credit are key drivers of the different 
response of SOEs to trade liberalization. Further empirical tests broadly validate these insights. 
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1 Introduction
In the major emerging economies, state owned enterprises (SOEs) still account for a substantial share
of income and capital. Focusing on the Forbes Global 2000 list of the world’s largest 2,000 public
companies and their 330,000 subsidiaries worldwide, a recent OECD study shows that SOE sales,
market values, and assets account for a large share of the economy in BRIC countries (Kowalski,
Bu¨ge, Sztajerowska, and Egeland, 2013).1 The strong presence of SOEs and the staggering recent
success of these economies has triggered a new debate over “state capitalism” as a viable growth and
development model (The Economist, 2012). Although they are at the center stage of this important
debate, our understanding of this new form of enterprises is still in very limited. What do SOEs do?
How do they respond, if at all, to market forces and reforms? Are they an obstacle or an engine of
growth in a globalized economy? Using a new rich data set of Vietnamese firms, we first document a set
of empirical regularities on SOEs operations and on those of private firms (POEs). Then, we examine
the effect of large scale trade reform, the 2007 entry into the WTO, on selection, firm profitability, and
productivity for both POEs and SOEs. Third, using a simple model of trade under firm heterogeneity
in a small economy, we highlight how specific features of SOEs, regulatory/political barriers to entry
and preferential access to credit, can shape the economic mechanisms driving their different response
to trade. Specific tests provide empirical validations of these mechanisms.
Vietnam represents an ideal country for our research purposes, since more than one-third of its
economy is still state owned and the WTO accession represents one of the largest market reforms,
possibly the largest, in its history. We rely on data from the General Statistics Office (GSO), which
covers the entire spectrum of Vietnamese firms over the period 2006-2012. Given that Vietnam was
in a weak bargaining position in seeking accession to the WTO, MFN tariff cuts provide arguably
exogenous variation in international exposure, as tariff rates fell from an average of 20% in 2006 to
8% in 2009, and varied extensively across industries. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we
directly estimate the impact of the reduction in Vietnam’s Most Favored National (MFN) tariffs on the
probability of exit of private firms in comparison to SOEs. We also assess the impact of MFN cuts on
firm profitability. In addition to analysis at the firm level, we study the impact of MFN cuts on average
productivity at the industry level, exploiting the cross-industry variation of SOEs’ presence. The main
econometric challenge is that private firms are likely to differ from SOEs in many characteristics, which
could also affect their probability of entering and exiting the market. We account for this source of
heterogeneity by using entropy balancing to establish a reasonable comparison group between POEs
and SOEs with respect to a battery of firm-level and industry-level confounding factors. In addition,
we saturate our models with a large number of fixed effects (including firm fixed effects) to account for
possible confounding factors and industry specific time trends to mitigate concerns about the violation
of the parallel trend assumption.
Our econometric analysis produces the following empirical findings. First, we only find strong ev-
idence of trade-induced selection for POEs and less so for SOEs: Private firms are significantly more
likely to exit the market compared to SOEs after Vietnam’s accession to the WTO. Second, we find
1Based on Country SOE Share (CSS), an index of weighted averages of SOE shares of sales, assets, and market values
among countries’ top 10 companies, the paper reports that about 95% of top 10 Chinese companies are SOEs, while in
Russia, India, and Brazil, SOEs represent 80%, 60%, and 50% of top firms respectively.
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that POEs profitability decrease after WTO accession, whereas we do not observe any pro-competitive
effects of trade for SOEs. Third, productivity increases after trade liberalization in industries with a
negligible presence of SOEs, whereas this effect disappears as the presence of SOEs becomes substan-
tial.
The overall productivity gains of this radical trade reform have been lower than expected. We
show that WTO access tariff cuts are associated with an annual average increase in manufacturing
productivity of 3.7% during the period 2008-2012. Given that the Vietnamese economy featured
a robust growth in the pre-WTO period, but far behind the East Asia miracle pace, larger gains
were expected from a small, fairly closed, economy like Vietnam joining the WTO.2 Trefler (2004),
finds that larger and less closed economies like Canada and the US obtained similar gains from their
bilateral trade agreement.3 We show that the presence of SOEs can partially account for the missing
productivity gains. We do this by simulating a counterfactual scenario in which we measure the
productivity gains that would have been brought about by WTO accession had SOEs not been a
strong presence in the economy. This exercise suggests that in the period between 2008 and 2012
the overall productivity gains would have been 40% larger in a counterfactual economy where POEs
replace SOEs. In sum, our results indicate that SOEs represent a substantial obstacle to trade-induced
efficiency gains.
We look for possible economic mechanisms behind these results through the lenses of a trade model
with firm heterogeneity in productivity and ownership. We devise a small open economy version of
the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model with POEs and SOEs similar in all features except that
the latter may operate in sectors subject to higher political/regulatory barriers to entry and have
cheaper and more flexible access to credit. Higher barriers to entry allow SOEs to operate in less
competitive markets where they are protected from domestic and foreign competition. Politically
regulated entry hampers the pro-competitive effect of trade on firm profitability and firm selection.
Things work differently for private firms that face pecuniary barriers to entry due to credit constrains
in financing their initial investment. We show that stronger credit constraints generate less entry
and less competitive markets, and POEs operating in less competitive industries experience stronger
pro-competitive and selection effect of trade. Hence, when entry is regulated politically, liberalization
does not increase competition and efficiency, while, when barriers to entry are economic, the impact of
trade on competition is stronger the larger the barriers. In our model, as in standard models of trade
with firm heterogeneity, selection is a source of trade-induced productivity growth. Consequently, by
hampering selection, the presence of SOEs represents a drag on the productivity gains from trade
liberalization.
Firms often need to borrow to finance their fixed operating costs, periodic expenses unrelated
with the volume of production and sales, such as rental cost of land use, office space, equipment,
licences, etc. These expenses play a key role for selection and exit (e.g. Hopenhayn, 1992, Melitz,
2003) because they have to be fully paid even when firms scale down production due to increasing
2Vietnam’s GDP grew at about 5.5% between 1985 and 2007, and at 6% in the post WTO period till 2016. Per-capita
GDP growth is 3.8% pre-WTO and 4.8% post.
3He shows that the reduction in Canadian tariffs following the US-Canada free trade agreement triggered a selection
effect resulting in a 4.3% increase in Canadian manufacturing productivity. Lileeva and Trefler (2010) find that the
reduction in US tariffs associated with the free trade agreement shifted market shares toward highly productive Canadian
exporters, leading to an increase in productivity of 4.1%.
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competitive pressure. Introducing fixed operating costs and credit constraints on them in the model,
we show that the availability of cheaper and more flexible credit conditions allows SOEs to soften the
economic constraints represented by these costs, thereby helping them to weather foreign competition
better than private firms.
We then go back to the data and search for empirical validation of these insights. First, we find that
the selection effect of WTO is stronger for POEs operating in less competitive (more concentrated)
industries. Moreover, we find that POEs entry shows a strong positive response to WTO access, while
the entry rate of SOEs does not have a statistically significant correlation with the WTO. Then we
show that POEs with a larger debt ratio exit more after trade liberalization, while this relationship
is not significant for SOEs. We also build a measure of the cost of borrowing, using firms’ interest
payment over their debt, and show that trade liberalization decreases this cost substantially for SOEs,
but not for POEs. This is consistent with the model’s suggestion that cheaper and better access to
credit weakens the SOEs’ response to trade liberalization.
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, several empirical papers have
documented the positive effects of trade on industry productivity through tougher selection and market
share reallocation.4 Pavcnik (2002), Trefler (2004), Bernard, Jensen, and Scott (2006), Amiti and
Konings (2007), Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), and Brandt et al (2017), among others, analyse
the effects of important trade liberalization episodes for Chile, the United States and Canada; the
United States alone; Indonesia; India; and China. These works find that a substantial part of the
trade-induced increase in productivity is generated by selection and intra-industry reallocations. Our
paper contributes to this literature by assessing the productivity gains from trade through inter-firm
reallocation in an economy with a non-negligible share of firms owned by the state and with a particular
focus on the different response of SOEs and POEs.
There is a stream of new empirical papers assessing the pro-competitive effects of trade with firm-
level data. Feenstra and Weinstein (2016) find a substantial reduction in average markups in the US
between 1992 and 2005 associated to a large increase in import shares. De Loecker et al. (2016), find
that in large trade liberalization episode in India output tariffs reduced markups and that this pro-
competitive effect was more than compensated by the positive effect of input tariff cuts on markups.
More strictly related to our work, Brandt et al. (2017) show that output tariff cuts related to China’s
access into the WTO have negative effects on markups and positive effects on TFP, in line with our
findings. They also find that input tariff cuts raise both markups and productivity. Although China,
as much as Vietnam, has a strong presence of SOEs, the objective of the paper is not to understand
the different response of SOEs and POEs to trade. They rather focus on analyzing the different effects
of input and output tariffs and on the different response of incumbent firms and entrants.5
While SOEs have been largely overlooked by previous studies, there is an emerging literature
analyzing different features of ‘state capitalism’. Not surprisingly, much of this literature focuses on
4For recent extensive surveys and assessment of the empirical literature on trade with firm heterogeneity, see Bernard,
Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2012) and Melitz and Trefler (2012).
5SOEs are briefly discussed in the short section that analyses the role of the agency problem in shaping the effects
of trade on productivity. They show that a higher likelihood of exit following trade liberalization provides increased
incentives for effort provision for managers in private firms which, in turn, leads to higher productivity. This mechanism
is not operating for SOEs, which instead feature a higher CEOs turnover in the face of stronger foreign competition. We
complement this results focusing on the role of barriers to entry and credit constraints.
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China. Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2010) present a theory of economic transition in China based
on reallocation of manufacturing from less productive SOEs to highly productive “entrepreneurial”
firms. Credit constraints and other cost wedges prevent entry of more productive private firms and
shelter sluggish SOEs from competition. Economic reforms reduce the cost wedges between the two
types of firms and trigger a reallocation of resources toward the most efficient firms, thereby setting
the economy on a path of privatization and fast growth. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) find that about
two-thirds of aggregate TFP growth in China between 1998 and 2005 - a period that includes China’s
access to the WTO in 2001 - can be attributed to reallocation from low- to high-productivity plants.
Hsieh and Song (2015) compare this view of China’s growth, the triumph of “Markets over Mao,”with
the conflicting view that ‘state capitalism’ through large and successful SOEs has driven growth and
development in China. They provide empirical evidence that the drastic reforms of Chinese SOEs
that started in the late 1990s led to the privatisation or closure of small and inefficient firms, while
large firms were corporatised and kept under state control. They find that the labor productivity
of these large SOEs has converged to that of private firms, and SOEs were responsible for about a
fifth of aggregate TFP growth during the period 1998-2007. In line with this research, we analyse the
productivity effects of reallocations from low- to high-productivity firms, but we differ by focusing on
the specific role of trade liberalization as a source of productivity growth in an economy with a large
presence of SOEs.6
Third, preferential trade agreements have recently begun to involve discussions about behind-the-
border barriers. These include domestic regulations on the environment, health, safety and labor
standards, and domestic taxation, which often generate non-tariff barriers behind national borders.
As discussed in Ederington and Ruta (2016), the WTO is taking its first steps in the direction of
eliciting cooperation on this type of barriers, especially regarding product and process standards. The
empirical and theoretical literature are also trying to understand the nature of these barriers and the
mechanisms through which they affect the costs and benefits of international trade agreements. Recent
research has shown that commitment issues (Brou and Ruta, 2013), bilateral bargaining over prices
(Antras and Steiger, 2012) and coordination externalities (Costinot, 2008) can motivate the need for
“deep integration,”going beyond tariff reductions to include coordination of domestic policies.7 Our
paper suggests that political/regulatory entry barriers and preferential access to credit can function
as de facto behind-the-border barriers and hamper gains from “shallow” integration limited to tariff
reduction. Our findings highlight the presence of an important complementarity between trade liber-
alization and domestic product market reforms. In line with our results, but using cross-country data
from 126 countries Freund and Bolaky (2008) show that trade is associated with higher standards of
living in economies with less regulated firm entry. They find that a 1% increase in the trade share of
GDP is associated with more than a one-half percent rise in per-capita income in economies with low
6Another point of difference is our focus on Vietnam instead of China. There is little work on the productivity
and welfare effects of Vietnam’s WTO accession. Fosse and Raimondos-Moller (2012) and Gosh and Whalley (2008)
use general equilibrium trade models with SOEs and calibrate them to Vietnam in order to study the effects of trade
liberalization. These papers limit their analysis to economies with representative firms and perform calibration exercises.
Our paper, instead, introduces heterogeneity of firm productivity and ownership and assesses Vietnam’s WTO entry
using firm-level data and by conducting reduced form econometric analysis.
7Horn, Maggi, and Staiger (2010) shed a skeptical light noting that removing behind-the-border barriers is more
costly than removing border measures, because the former are less transparent than the latter.
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barriers to firm entry, but has no effects in more rigid economies.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we offer an overview of the
characteristics of Vietnamese firms and document the reduction in trade barriers produced by WTO
accession. In the third section, we discuss our empirical strategy, present the empirical results, and
implement some robustness checks to further validate our findings. In the fourth section, we present a
model that provides an interpretation of our main empirical findings, suggesting some specific economic
mechanisms. A fifth section provides an empirical validation of the mechanisms highlighted by the
model. A final section concludes.
2 Market Reforms and Vietnamese Firms
In this section we document the reduction in trade barriers brought about by Vietnam’s WTO ac-
cession, provide a brief discussion of the SOE reforms which started before the accession, and report
several stylised facts on Vietnamese firms.
Data. Before presenting the stylised facts, we describe the data and the main variables of interest.
Our data come from the annual Enterprise Census of firms performed by Vietnam’s GSO for the pe-
riod 2006-2012. They include the entire universe of Vietnamese firms that have at least 10 employees,
and contain a rich set of firm-level characteristics.8 We follow the classification of firm ownership em-
ployed in Vietnamese statistical handbooks and divide business operations into three large categories:
state owned enterprises, including centrally-managed SOEs, locally-managed SOEs, and limited lia-
bility companies of which all shares are controlled by state agencies; the non-state sector, including
registered private domestic operations and cooperatives; and foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) that
have less than 50% state ownership. Large SOEs often have multiple subsidiaries, which compete in
multiple industries, often outside of the core competency of the main SOE. To more directly model
the competition between state and private sectors, we treat each subsidiary as an individual unit in
our analysis. This allows for more diversity in the sectorial pattern of SOE participation than analyses
that rely solely on the parent firm’s headline sector. In addition, it aids comparisons between SOEs
and private firms, because the subsidiaries are more similarly sized.
Following common practice, we do not include FIEs in our private firms category (POE), although
we always control for FIEs in the econometric analysis. The trade categorisation of the survey follows
the fourth revision of the International Standard Industrial Classifications (ISICv4). The tariff data
come from TRAINS (WITS) and are at the HS 6-digit level. We create a crosswalk from ISICv4 to HS
6-digit to merge the GSO data with tariff data. Next, we cross-check the WITS tariff data with the
WTO tariff data. All the sources report the same tariff rates. We merge the tariff data at 6-digit level
with the 4-digit firm-level data using average tariff values. The trade data come from COMTRADE
and are at the HS 6-digit level. In merging the WTO tariff data and the GSO firm-level data, we
lose around 20,000 firms for which the trade categories do not match. These firms are almost always
8The Enterprise Census includes a random sample of firms under 10 employees outside of those in the panel. The
data do not include firms that operate in the informal economy. The variables are reported in Vietnamese and translated
into English by us.
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in sectors, such as incense stick making or ice delivery, for which international analogues are hard to
identify.
Before providing an overview of Vietnamese firms, we describe the main variables that we use both
in this descriptive section and in the empirical section. Exit is defined as the probability of exit for firm
f in industry i between year t and t+1. Formally, Exitfi,t = Pr(Exitfi,t = 1). The panel structure of
the Vietnamese firm-level data collected by the annual Enterprise Census allows us to track firms by
tax code over time. In line with previous studies (Pavcinik, 2002; Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011), we
use revenue-based total factor productivity TFPR.9 Moreover, we use the price-cost margin (PCM)
as a proxy for firm profitability. Since we have a direct measure of firm profits in our data, it is
straightforward to compute PCM as profits over revenues.10 Finally, the logged number of employees
is a proxy for size and the capital-labor ratio is a proxy for capital-intensive sectors.
WTO accession. We start documenting the characteristics of the tariff cuts brought about by WTO
entry. We begin with the MFN tariff cuts implemented by Vietnam to enter the WTO. Tariff cuts are
defined as the inverse first differences for each industry i, i.e., MFNi,t−1−MFNi,t, with larger values
implying greater trade liberalization. The data are collected using the HS trade categorisation at the
6-digit level and come from WITS (2014). Since our tariff data are at the sectorial level, to analyse
the characteristics and performance of private and public firms we break down our sample from the
GSO census, creating two macro sectors based on firm ownership. We refer to an ISIC 4-digit sector
as SOE-dominated if the SOE labor share is larger than 40%, which is the upper quartile, i.e., 75th
percentile. In the analysis that follows this is a dummy variable labeled SOE-dominated Sector.11
The first thing to notice in Figure 1 is that with the exception of the year 2012 the MFN tariff
cuts faced by POE-dominated sectors were roughly comparable to the MFN tariff cuts faced by SOE-
dominated sectors. This result mitigates concerns that multilateral trade liberalization is endogenous
to the type of ownership. The second thing to notice is that there is a great deal of variation across
industry types in terms of tariff reduction. Digging inside our two macro sectors, we look at the
variation of tariff cuts across 2-digit industries (see Figure A1 in the appendix).12 There is evidence
that POE-dominated sectors faced larger tariff cuts than SOE-dominated sectors in the following
industries: food processing, textiles, wood, and precision instruments (see Figure A2 in the appendix).
The furniture industry appears to be the only one in which the SOE-dominated sector faced larger
MFN cuts than the POE-dominated sector.
9TFPR is calculated using simple firm-level Solow residuals. We calculate TFPR for each firm-year by regressing the
firm-level log of revenue on firm-level physical assets, employment, year and 4-digit industry fixed effects. The residuals
of this regression, which might also be negative, are our time-varying measures of firm productivity.
10We exclude from the sample firms that have negative firm profitability and firm profitability than one. The difference
in mean between POE and SOE is not significant for firm profitability lower than zero and higher than one. Our results are
not substantively different if we include these observations. Ideally, we would have liked to use markups. Unfortunately,
our data do not include accurate pricing data on inputs and we are therefore unable to derive output elasticities such as
those in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).
11Results are not sensitive to this threshold and are similar if we use fractions of SOEs over total number of firms in
a industry, SOE revenue share, and fraction of SOE capital in each industry.
12Since the macro POE and SOE sectors are defined at the 4-digit level, in the same 2-digit industries there might be
both POE-dominated and SOE-dominated sectors at the ISIC 4-digit level.
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Figure 1: MFN tariff cuts after WTO accession over time.
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The SOE reform. In 1986, the Vietnamese government launched Doi Moi (Renovation), an am-
bitious program of economic reforms which resulted in dismantling most instruments of control over
the economy. Among the most critical pillars of Doi Moi was a separation of SOE business operations
from state planning in Decision 217/HDBT of 1987. The 12,000 SOEs that existed at the time were
given general guidelines as part of the government’s 10-year socioeconomic plan, but their decisions
were independent of ministerial planning. They were expected to negotiate the price of inputs with
suppliers and set their own prices based on market costs. SOE profits were calculated based on the
true costs of material inputs (although this figure did not include land and cheap capital), and, with
the exception of a compulsory tax payment to the central or local government, SOEs were allowed to
retain their profits and reinvest as they saw fit. A number of SOEs struggled under these conditions
and these low-performing operations were soon liquidated by the government authorities or equitised
with their shares sold to the private sector.13 In 1995, the hiving off of SOE business operations was
further institutionalised under Decisions 90 and 91. Decision 90 merged SOEs into 17 large holding
companies, which became the monopoly conglomerates that we see today. Decision 91 created another
group of 70 central conglomerates. The new conglomerates were encouraged to structure themselves
in such a way as to provide incentives for SOEs to operate along commercial lines.14 In 2006, with
SOEs now equitising by selling shares and even listing shares on the stock market, the government
13See Painter (2002) for a detailed discussion of the Doi Moi reforms.
14A similar reform process took place in China in the 1990s, in which SOEs were “corporatised” and merged into large
state-owned conglomerates. See Hsieh and Song (2015) for details.
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formed the State Council Investment Corporation (SCIC) to manage the state assets held by the newly
equitised firms under a single entity. The SCIC has decision-making autonomy and is not subject to
state planning considerations. Hence, as a result of the economic reform path started in the 1980s,
on the eve of the WTO accession Vietnamese SOEs had substantial autonomy from the government
in planning their business strategies.15
Differences between POEs and SOEs. The aforementioned waves of privatisation explain why
the number of SOEs was relatively small compared to the number of POEs at the moment of Viet-
nam’s accession to the WTO. In our census data, before WTO accession we have 2,086 fully-owned
SOEs and 1,731 joint stock companies where Vietnamese state agencies were the dominant remaining
shareholders. Together, on the eve of WTO accession, these SOEs accounted for 20% of gross indus-
trial output, 37.2% of new investment, and about 11% of total employment (24% of labor employed
by the formal business sector). By contrast, there were 151,576 POEs in Vietnam: 146,615 domestic
companies and 4,961 active FIE operations. Together, they accounted for 80% of industrial output
(35% domestic, 45% foreign), 63% of new investment (38.5% domestic, 24% foreign), and about 33%
of total employment (76% of the formal business sector).
The share of firms accounted for by SOEs is roughly 5% of operations across all broad sectors
except for agriculture, where SOEs account for 35%. SOEs agricultural operations include large-scale
plantations for producing rubber, and major food processing operations, such as rice mills. Although
the number of SOEs is relatively low, SOE capital investment is significantly higher compared to the
capital investment of other firms. For instance, while SOEs represent only 7.5% of mining firms, they
account for over 80% of the stock of capital in this sector. Similarly, large SOEs account for 80% of
capital in the agriculture and electricity sectors. The major exception is manufacturing, where SOEs
account for about 40% of capital, which still signals a substantial presence. In our empirical analysis
we will focus on manufacturing sectors.
Table 1: SOE vs POE: Firm characteristics in Vietnam before and after WTO accession.
Statistics 2006-2007 2008-2010 2011-2012
SOEs POEs SOEs POEs SOEs POEs
Exit* (% of firms) 0.72 3.33 3.81 10.22 2.41 10.13
Mean Productivity (TFPR) -0.10 0.02 -0.17 -0.01 -0.40 0.01
Std. Productivity (TFPR) 1.12 1.11 1.31 1.84 1.62 1.83
Mean Firm Profitability 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.04
Mean Employment (logs) 5.81 3.13 5.72 2.92 4.94 2.72
Note: the difference between SOE and POE is statistically significant (p<.05) for each covari-
ate.
Next, we document some other differences in key firm-level characteristics between SOEs and POEs
both before and after WTO access. In Table 1 we can see that although SOEs do exit, the probability
of this event is substantially lower for them than for private firms. Although WTO access increases
15Vasavakul (1997) and Vo (2007) provide in-depth examinations of the reforms implemented after Doi Moi.
8
the exit hazard for both firms, their difference persists. A second remarkable difference is that SOEs
have a strikingly stronger market power, as their average profitability is significantly larger than that
of POEs in our sample periods. Moreover, while we observe substantial profitability reductions for
POEs post-WTO, firm profitability slightly increases for SOEs.
Figure 2: Distribution of POE TFPR and SOE TFPR pre- and post-WTO accession.
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Note: the difference between TFPR of SOE and TFPR of POE is statistically significant (p<.05) in 2011-2012.
Another remarkable feature is the size and productivity difference. SOEs are larger and less
productive than POEs. Figure 2 provides a more suggestive picture of the productivity difference
and its change over time. During the period 2006-2007 there is a wide productivity dispersion for
both types of firms, and a substantial overlap between the two productivity distributions. However,
POEs are on average more productive than SOEs even prior to the WTO accession. In the post-WTO
years, the distribution for POEs progressively shifts to the right and, as a result, the productivity gap
between POEs and SOEs widens. We also find that the average firm (measured as the log of number
of employees) size declines for both POEs and SOEs.
The descriptive statistics presented above suggest that on the eve of WTO access, Vietnamese
SOEs despite being corporatized and drastically reformed, were more profitable and less productive
than private firms. Here we discuss further evidence on SOEs market power, using our data when
possible but also referring to other work in order to provide a more comprehensive view. First, we
look at market concentration measures. In Figure 3, we show that sectors dominated by SOEs have
remarkably higher Herfindahl indices and lower import penetration than POE-dominated sectors.16
16The Herfindahl index is calculated using revenue. Import penetration is defined as ratio of total import over revenue
by sector (4-digit industry level) and for each year.
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This suggests the presence of higher barriers to entry in the sectors with a stronger presence of SOEs.
The literature documenting barriers shielding Vietnamese SOEs from competition focuses on several
factors. First, certain sectors face formal restrictions for purported national security reasons. These
sectors, known as “Group A” projects, require special approval from the prime minister’s office to
receive an investment entry license. While provinces can locally register any investment up to a
specified amount, Group A projects still require central approval and the prime minister’s signature
(Malesky et al., 2014).17 Second, as in China (Song et al., 2011), many SOEs operate in capital-
intensive sectors for which private firms currently do not have the scale or access to capital necessary
to compete. Utilities, shipbuilding, steel, and cement production are all industries that are formally
open but actually feature little private activity (Phan and Coxhead, 2013).
Figure 3: POE-dominated vs. SOE-dominated industries: Average Herfindal index and import
penetration.
.16
.18
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.22
.24
.26
POE-dominated SOE-dominated 
Market concentration 95% CI
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
POE-dominated SOE-dominated 
Import penetration 95% CI
Note: The Herfindal index is measured using firm revenue. Import penetration is given by
import
revenue
. We take the log of import penetration.
Further evidence shows that access to credit is greater when firms have close connections to the
party and government (Malesky and Taussig, 2009). Even in 2013, after the dramatic growth of the
private sector, roughly 60% of lending by the state-owned banking sector went to SOEs. As we will
see in Section 5, our data show that the cost of credit, measured as a firm’s interest expenses divided
by its debt, which is similar for POEs and SOEs before WTO access, becomes substantially lower for
17One frustration for POEs is that SOEs have been able to use these protected enclaves to cross-subsidize their
expansion into mixed sectors. For instance, Vinashin, the state ship-building firm, has 445 subsidiary businesses and 20
joint ventures, which range from real estate to hotels to karaoke bars. These sideline businesses crowd out entrepreneurial
businesses (Nguyen and Freeman, 2009).
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the state-owned firms after WTO. Differential access to credit can generate different barriers to entry
or exit between firms. Market access is easier for SOEs than for private firms (Nguyen and Freeman,
2009). This is particularly true for government procurement (Pincus et al., 2012). Moreover, previous
studies have found that for land use rights certificates, private firms face processing times that are
200 hundred times greater than those faced by SOEs (Tenev et al., 2003; Pincus et al., 2012). We can
get an overall sense of the barriers to competition protecting SOE activity by looking at the annual
Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) survey, a survey of 8,500 firms which is conducted annually by
the Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry in order to assess the business environments of
Vietnamese provinces.18 Responses to a battery of questions in the PCI survey suggest a bias toward
state-owned firms in Vietnamese policy-making. In particular, we find the biggest bias toward SOEs
in public procurement and access to credit (see Figures A2 and A3 in the appendix).
3 Empirical Analysis
We assess Vietnam’s accession to the WTO on selection, firm profitability, and productivity, using the
firm-level data described in Section 2. We restrict the analysis to manufacturing industries. The core
of the empirics focuses on the firm-level analysis to test the combining effect of tariff cuts and type of
ownership on firm’s exit and firm profitability. In the last part of the empirics, using industry-level
analysis we test the effect of WTO on productivity at the industry level, and by means of a simple
counterfactual exercise we provide a first, partial, assessment of the foregone productivity gains from
trade due to the presence of SOEs.
3.1 Firm-Level Analysis
Main Variables and Sample. To test the effect of Vietnams’ accession to the WTO at the firm
level, we focus on two dependent variables, Exit and Firm Profitability, described in Section 2. Our
main independent variables are a dummy scoring one if a firm is private (POEfi), MFN tariff cuts
(∆τi,t), which are the tariff cuts implemented by the Vietnamese government after the accession to the
WTO, and their interaction. Not all tariff cuts were implemented in the same year as the accession,
and a tariff transition period was granted to many industries. Therefore, MFN tariff cuts vary over
time in the post-WTO period. Importantly, we include a dummy for foreign firms in every models so
that the baseline is always SOEs.19
In our most extensive analysis, we estimate a sample of 46,212 Vietnamese firms between 2006 and
2012 for Exit.20 We analyse the effect of trade liberalization on up to 118 manufacturing products
(ISIC 4-digit) for which tariff data are available. Our main models are estimated using OLS regression
with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
18For further information, see www.pcivietnam.org.
19In the main models we do not include the interaction terms of foreign firms to ease the interpretation of the main
coefficients of interest. However, all the main results are virtually the same if we include the interaction terms of foreign
firms (see Figures A4 and A6).
20Less than 2% of firms in the original sample switches category, e.g., from POE to SOE or from POE to foreign
firm. We drop these observations, since we assume that the type of ownership is exogenous in our empirical models. In
other words, the dummy POE is at its baseline value. This modelling decision does not affect our results (see tables in
appendix A4).
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Econometric Strategy. Our empirical strategy boils down to a difference-in-differences with elas-
ticities. POE is our treatment, which distinguishes firms according to the type of ownership. ∆τ
captures the magnitude of trade liberalization for each industry i, which kicks in after the accession
to the WTO, that is, after 2007.
Our firm-level analysis faces several identification challenges. The first threat to inference we
face is the large difference in the covariates observed between private firms and SOEs. Indeed, our
preliminary look at the data in Section 2 has shown that the SOEs tend to be larger than private
firms; we also find that they are more capital intensive and have more assets than the POEs.21 In
econometric terms, the observations are unbalanced with respect to the dummy variable SOE. This
poses a threat to our conclusions if these observed differences are also correlated with differences in
the probability of exiting the market, or if they proxy for unobserved differences that might drive the
correlation. To overcome this issue, we rely on entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012). This technique
is similar to propensity matching, but it has the welcome feature that unbalanced observations are not
dropped from the analysis. Specifically, by using entropy balancing observations are re-weighted with
respect to the treatment (i.e., SOE) so that all the relevant covariates are balanced (i.e., they have
the same mean). In econometric terms, entropy balancing reweights the observations to statistically
generate a region of common support where private and public companies are comparable on structural
covariates.22
Table A1 (bottom) in the appendix shows the means of private firms and state owned firms before
and after balancing. By using entropy balancing, the difference in means between POEs and SOES
is substantially reduced and is never statistically significantly different from zero. Importantly, we
balance all the exogenous control variables with respect to POE, i.e., Size, Assets, Capital-labor ratio,
MFN tariff, Exports, US PTA, Age, and Age2. The endogenous variables, e.g., firm profitability and
firm’s debt, are not included in entropy balancing, a decision that does not affect our main results.
Then we run our main models using the weights obtained from entropy balancing.
Second, following Angrist and Pischke (2009), we include industry-specific (4-digit) time trends
to check if the parallel trend assumption holds. The inclusion of such variables accounts for sectorial
growth trends which might be related to MFN tariff cuts. For instance, declining industries with a large
number of firms exiting might have higher tariffs and hence deep MFN cuts. Third, in order to further
account for sources of industry-level heterogeneity, we include time-varying industry (2-digit) fixed
effects to control for time-varying unobserved factors. Such fixed effects account for industry-specific
demand and supply shocks, which in turn might affect the probability of exiting the market. Fourth,
in some estimates, we include firm fixed effects to account for time-invariant firm-level characteristics.
Since we have a fairly short time span, exploiting within-firm variation is a very demanding test.
Fifth, following Trefler (2004), we include controls of business conditions built at the industry
level to account for the 2008 global economic crisis. Specifically, these controls are built by regressing
the number of exiting firms and their profitability in industry i at time t over Vietnam’s GDP and
21Table A1 (top) in the appendix shows how the relevant covariates are unbalanced between POEs and SOEs.
22Entropy balancing does this by directly incorporating covariate balance into the weight function that is applied to
the sample units. The net result is that we can compare SOEs to a comparable counterfactual of private firms. We
perform this exercise using “ebalance” in Stata 14, the software created by Hainmueller (2012). We adjust the covariates,
using the first moment, i.e., we set target equal to one.
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Vietnam’s real interest rate, including industry and year fixed effects.23 These regressions generate a
time-varying industry-specific prediction (Êxit and and ̂FirmProfitability) of the effect of business
conditions on the WTO-period probability of exiting for firm f and its profitability. We include these
predicted values on the right-hand side of some models.
Finally, we address the concern of a possible endogeneity of MFN tariff cuts, which could potentially
invalidate our empirical strategy. In line with Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), we show that TFPR
and firm profitability do not predict MFN tariff cuts, that is, neither productivity nor firm profitability
are statistically significant in estimations in which MFN cuts are the outcome variable (see Table A2
in the appendix). This is the case even when we interact both productivity and firm profitability
with SOE Labor Share. Hence, it does not seem to be the case that trade liberalization is greater
in industries in which the anticipated gains from trade are higher. These results seem to indicate
that Vietnam had to meet externally imposed benchmarks in order to join the WTO, requiring the
implementation of a demanding trade liberalization (Pelc, 2011). The strong bargaining power of the
WTO paired with the relatively weak bargaining position of Vietnam mitigates concerns that MFN
cuts are endogenous to firm-level and industry-level characteristics.24
Selection Effect. We begin with exploring how tariff cuts affect the probability of exiting for POEs
and SOEs. In line with Bernard et al. (2006), for the exit probability of firm f in industry i at time
t+ 1 we estimate the following model:
Pr(Exitfi,t = 1) = β0+β1POEfi+β2∆τi,t−1+β3POEfi×∆τi,t−1+β4Xfi,t+β5Wi,t+δi+δt+ǫfi,t, (1)
where δi are industry (HS 4-digit) fixed effects to account for heterogeneity across products, and δt are
year fixed effects. The key coefficient of interest is β3, which should be positive. X and W are vectors
including, respectively, firm-level and industry-level covariates. Following Bernard et al. (2006), we
control for a set of confounding factors which might affect Exit and are correlated with our main
independent variables.25
At the firm level, we control for the logged number of employees, which is a proxy for size. We
expect that large firms are less likely to exit the market compared to small firms. We also include
the log of assets, and the capital-labor ratio, which are proxies for capital intensity. Moreover, as it is
customary, we include a variable measuring the number of years since a given firm entered the market
and began business operations (i.e., Age) and its square value.
At the product level (4-digit), we include (logged) values of exports to capture comparative ad-
vantage sectors, which should experience a lower rate of exit. Unfortunately, we do not have data on
export activities at the firm level. We also include a variable capturing market power, calculated using
the Herfindahl–Hirschman index of revenue, and preferential tariff cuts implemented in the bilateral
23We are unable to use the real exchange rate instead of the real interest rate due to a lack of data.
24Part of the WTO accession requirements was about the reform of SOEs and other corporate governance measures.
Details of these reforms can be found at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_vietnam_e.htm. Since
Vietnam accession to the WTO was negotiated for a number of years and firms have started readjusting their operations
in advance, we acknowledge that this may pose a threat to our identification strategy. However, since our key independent
variables are interaction terms between a dummy for SOEs and other covariates such as tariff cuts, productivity, and
firm profitability, it is unlikely that the endogeneity of SOEs affects our results.
25Table A3 in the appendix shows descriptive statistics of all the variables described below.
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trade agreement (BTA) between the US and Vietnam. It has been argued that the BTA was used
as a stepping stone for Vietnam’s accession to the WTO.26 We also include the difference between
MFN tariff in 1999 and MFN tariff in 2006, 2007, ... 2012 to account for the impact of negotiations
to enter the WTO on the outcome of interest. Indeed, it may be that the WTO affected firm’s exit
in the negotiation period rather than after Vietnam’s accession. We label this variable ∆τ1999.
27 We
run OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the level of the firm.28
Table 2 shows the main results of this analysis. We estimate several models as from equation 16.
We begin with estimates without controls and weights from entropy balancing (column 1), wihtout
controsl and with weights from entropy balancing (column 2), and then we include both of them
(Models 3 and 4) together with industry-year fixed effects (column 5) and industry-specific trends
(column 6). In our most demanding model specification, we include firm fixed effects to control for
firm-specific characteristics (column 7).29 Results indicate that the probability of exiting the market
increases with MFN tariff cuts for POEs, whereas it decreases for SOEs, as can be observed from the
positive sign of the coefficient of the interaction term (i.e., POE and ∆τ). Importantly, the interaction
term is significant in every estimates (see columns 1-6).
To ease the interpretation of the interaction terms, we rely on Figure 4, which shows the probability
of exiting the market for POEs and SOEs at different levels of tariff cuts.30 While the exit rate for
POEs increases with the magnitude of the MFN cuts, the same is not true for SOEs, which display
a flat slope. However, the slope of SOE should be taken cautiously. Indeed, there are only 38 SOEs
operating in industries with tariff cuts larger than 20 and only seven SOEs left the market in industries
with tariff cuts larger than 10. Thus, there is the risk of extrapolating the linear predictions of SOE
or, at the very least, there is the risk that only a few observations are driving the results.
To address this concern, we re-run our main models, replacing MFN tariff cuts with a dummy
that scores one after Vietnam’s accession to the WTO, i.e., after 2007. While results are reported in
Table A7 in the appendix, Figure 5 shows the graphical results of the interaction term and confirms
the results of Figure 4. Indeed, the slope of POE is positive, whereas the slope of SOE is completely
flat.31 All in all, these results show that Vietnam’s WTO accession generate a selection effect for
POE, but not for SOE.
Finally, TFPR, Number of Employees, Capital, Capital-labor Ratio, and Age are the control vari-
ables that are significant. They have usually the expected sign. Interestingly, once controlling for
TFPR and Capital, firm size increases the probability of exiting. Moroever, the coefficient of Capital-
26See what the US Ambassador in Vietnam Michael W. Marine says on this issue. The document is available at
http://www.vietnamembassy-algerie.org/en/vnemb.vn/tin_hddn/ns060705093904. For a paper showing the effect of
the BTA with the US on the Vietnamese economy, see McCaig (2011).
27We rely on 1999 MFN since data of pre-1999 tariffs are either unavailable or available for only a limited number of
industries.
28Our results are very similar if we rely on logit or probit models, though we lose some observations due to incidental
parameters. Our results are similar if we cluster standard errors at the level of the industry (Table A4) or at the level
of industry-year (Table A5) or if we double-cluster standard errors at the level of the firm and the industry (Table A6).
29We are impeded to include POE, since it does not vary over time.
30In testing our hypotheses, we always plot the linear predictions of POE and SOE separately. The difference between
the two slopes for each value of the moderator would give the marginal effect of the dummy POE on the outcome of
interest, which is the coefficient of the interaction terms reported in the tables.
31The models do not include year fixed effects as they correlate with the post-WTO accession dummy. Results are
similar if we include year fixed effects and drop the post-WTO dummy, leaving its interaction with POE.
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Table 2: POE vs. SOE: exit and MFN tariff cuts.
(1) (2) (3) (5) (5) (6) (7)
POE 0.050*** 0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(0.003) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
MFN Tariff Cut -0.002*** -0.004* -0.001 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.002 -0.002**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut 0.002*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
FIE -0.034*** 0.074*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.056*** 0.058***
(0.003) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
TFPR -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
HHI 0.024 0.024 0.060* 0.051* -0.000
(0.026) (0.026) (0.036) (0.026) (0.005)
Number of Employees 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.009***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Capital -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.011***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002)
Capital-labor Ratio 0.007* 0.007* 0.007** 0.007** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Export 0.004** 0.004** -0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Preferential Tariffs -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Age -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Age2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MFN Tariff Cut (1999) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
Constant -0.062*** -0.078*** 0.818*** 2.481*** 1.085***
(0.002) (0.008) (0.050) (0.380) (0.122)
Observations 226,050 217,163 216,594 216,594 217,163 216,594 202,798
R-squared 0.038 0.203 0.451 0.451 0.460 0.457 0.436
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Business control NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Trends NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Firm FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
OLS
Pr(Exit=1)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the firm level. The outcome variable is
a dummy scoring one if firm exits the market in year t. The main independent variable is the
interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and POE.
15
Figure 4: POE vs. SOE: the effect of MFN tariff cuts on firm’s exit.
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Note: The predictions are plotted from column 3 in Table 2. OLS regression with industry (4-
digit) fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The histogram shows
the distribution of ∆τ . 95% C.I.
Figure 5: POE vs. SOE: the effect of the WTO accession on firm’s exit
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Note: The predictions are plotted from column 2 in Table A4. OLS regression with industry
(4-digit) fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The histogram shows
the distribution of the dummy capturing Vietnam’s WTO accession. 95% C.I.
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labor Ratio has a positive sign32 Furthermore, some of the covariates may absorb some of the structural
differences between POEs and SOEs, e.g. Number of Employees, Capital, Age, which may explain why
the coefficient of POE is not significant.
Robustness Checks. We perform several tests to check the robustness of our results. First, a
characteristic of Vietnamese POEs is that the state might own a percentage of their capital. In
other words, there are some POEs that rely on exclusive private capital and others that rely on a
mix of private and public capital. We re-estimate the main models distinguishing between these two
types of POEs. Results from these models are reported in Table A8 in the appendix. Results show
that the most significant differences are between SOEs and POEs, whereas there is not much of a
difference between completely private firms and private firms partially owned by the state. Second,
we distinguish between local and central SOEs. Results of this test are reported in Tables A9, whose
sample excludes central SOE, and A10, whose sample excludes local SOEs, and show that there is no
difference between this two types of SOEs.
Third, we estimate the models with Exit as the outcome variable, using survival analysis. Survival
analysis allows us to estimate the duration of firms surviving (i.e., not exiting) the market. We
expect that POE × ∆τ shortens the survival of firms, i.e., it increases the hazard rate of exit. The
main advantage of survival models over OLS is that they have a better handle on the right and left
censoring problem.33 We rely on a parametric survival model using a Weibull distribution, which
allows us to estimate accelerated failure time models.34 Our main results remain unchanged (see
Table A11, column 1).
Fourth, our results are similar if we use Propensity Score Matching (PSM), as Table A12 shows in
the appendix.35 Note that our sample shrinks when we use PSM, which drops unmatched observations.
Fifth, we interact each of the controls with the post-accession dummy, i.e. Post-WTO.36 Results are
reported in Table A13 in the appendix and are very similar to the one showed above.
Finally, we run a placebo test. Specifically, we interact POE with ∆τ1999, always controlling for
∆τ . If the WTO accession has an impact on a firm’s exit, this interaction should not be significant.
On the contrary, if the interaction between POE and ∆τ1999 is significant, it would imply that the
negotiation period triggered the selection effect prior to the WTO accession. Figure A5 in the appendix
shows that the interaction between POE and ∆τ1999 is not significant; confidence intervals are wide
and overlapping, confirming the specific importance of Vietnam’s accession to the WTO and mitigating
further concerns of anticipatory effects.
32This is potentially consistent with a comparative advantage argument, since Vietnam is labor-rich compared to many
WTO members countries whose economies are more developed.
33Left censoring refers to the fact that firms might have exited the market before 2006, i.e., before our time span
begins. Right censoring refers to the fact that firms might have exited the market after 2012, i.e., after the end of our
time span.
34The Weibull model is the most appropriate model, according to the Akaike information criterion.
35We use the Stata 14 command psmatch2, which implements full Mahalanobis matching (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003).
We use the single nearest-neighbor (without caliper) matching method and rely on standard errors as in Abadie and
Imbens (2006).
36For a similar approach, see Gentzkow (2006). Results are similar if we interact the control variables with year fixed
effects instead of the post-accession dummy.
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Firm Profitability. Our second dependent variable is Firm Profitability. The empirical strategy
remains the same as for the selection effect, i.e. a difference-in-differences with elasticity.37 Formally,
we estimate the following model:
Firm Profitabilityfi,t = γ0+γ1POEfi+γ2∆τi,t−1+γ3POEfi×∆τi,t−1+γ4Xfi,t+δi+δt+ǫfi,t, (2)
where the key coefficient of interest is γ3 , which should be negative. We include controls that affect
Firm Profitability and correlate with our main independent variables. More specifically, we include
productivity, a proxy for firm’s size (logged number of employees), Age, and Age2. All these controls
are at the firm level. At the industry level, we control for Vietnam’s preferential tariff cuts implemented
after the trade agreement with the US and for ∆τ1999.
Since our outcome variable is continuous and scores between zero and one, we run fractional
outcome regressions, which produce robust specification tests (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996, 2008),
with standard errors clustered at the level of the firm.38 In particular, fractional outcome regressions
avoid mis-specification and dubious statistical validity and capture non-linear relationships, especially
when the outcome is close to zero and one.39
Not controlling for the lagged level of firm profitability in equation 2 is inconsistent with the
assumption that firm profitability follows a Markov process in the estimation of the production function
(Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011). Therefore, to address the potential problem of serial correlation
in relation to Firm Profitability, we include a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side in
some estimates. The lagged dependent variable is always significant (see Table A15 in the appendix).
Including a lagged dependent variable with fixed effects in a short time series is problematic (Nickel,
1981). In line with Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), we use GMM regressions, which instrument the
lagged dependent variable with lags (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Although we lose a large number of
observations, the results of these estimates are clear-cut: firm profitability decreases for POEs but not
for SOEs after trade liberalization (see Table A16 in the appendix). Note that the coefficient of the
lagged dependent variable is significant, but close to zero, indicating that the problem of unit root is
not serious in our case, probably due to the short time-span.40
Table 3 shows the results of equation 2. Throughout all the estimates the coefficient of the
interaction between POE and ∆τ is always negative and statistically significant. This is the case
even when we include industry year fixed effects (column 5), trends (column 6), and firm fixed effects
(column 7), which are very demanding tests. Remember that the number of observations is lower
in these models because we dropped the firms with negative firm profitability and firms with firm
profitability higher than one.41
37We exclude assets and K
L
from entropy balancing.
38We obtain similar results if we run simple OLS regressions. Moreover, our results are similar if we cluster standard
errors at the level of the industry (Figure A7) or at the level of industry-year (Figure A8). We show these effects
graphically, since fractional regressions are nonlinear models and so standard errors may be milsleading (Ai and Norton
2003). Moreover, our results are similar if we double-cluster standard errors at the level of the firm and the industry for
which we run OLS regressions (Table A14).
39When we include industry specific trends, we are unable to run fractional outcome regressions, which do not converge.
As such, we run OLS regressions for columns 6 and 7 in Table 3.
40We obtain similar results if we double-difference both the left- and right-and-side variables and run OLS regressions
(Table A17 in the appendix).
41It is worth noticing that only the coefficients of TFPR and Number of Employees are significant among the controls
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Figure 6 shows the graphical interpretation of the interaction term, which refers to column 3. When
tariff cuts increase, POEs’ profitability decline significantly. This is evidence of the pro-competitive
effect. For SOEs instead, although the slope is still negative, it is not statistically significant. This can
be seen from the fact that the confidence intervals overlap for different values of MFN tariff cuts, i.e.,
linear predictions are statistically non-distinguishable one from the other for SOE. This finding implies
that tariff cuts have no effect on SOEs’ profitability. In short, trade liberalization does not trigger
higher product market competition for SOEs, the presence of which hamper the pro-competitive effect
of trade.
Figure 6: POE vs. SOEs: The effect of MFN tariff cuts on firm profitability.
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Note: The predictions are plotted from column 3 in Table 3. Fractional outcome regression
with industry (4-digit) fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The
histogram shows the distribution of ∆τ . 95% C.I.
Robustness Checks. We implement the same robustness checks as for the selection effect. In
particular, we distinguish between POEs and POEs that are partially owned by the state (Table
A18 in the appendix) and between local and central SOEs (Tables A19 and A20 in the appendix).
Moreover, we show that results are similar if we use PSM rather than entropy balancing (Table A21
and Figure A9 in the appendix). Furthermore, we show that our results hold if we include interactions
between each control and a dummy for the post-WTO accession (Table A22). Moreover, our placebo
test confirms that the interaction between POE and MFN tariffs is not significant if we use 1999 MFN
tariffs as baseline (Figure A10).
Finally, we re-run our main models, using input tariffs.42 We find that input tariff cuts increase
and they are both negative. Importantly, the coefficient of POE is significant in these estimates, indicating that these
covariates do not absorb all the differences between POEs and SOEs.
42We built a measure of input tariff following Topalova and Khandelwal (2011). Due to data limitations, we are unable
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Table 3: POE vs. SOE: Firm profitability and MFN tariff cuts.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POE -0.506*** -0.790*** -0.770*** -0.770*** -0.828*** -0.043***
(0.043) (0.178) (0.181) (0.181) (0.183) (0.015)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.001 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.002) (0.000)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut -0.006** -0.018** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.021** -0.002*** -0.001***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000)
FIE 0.446*** 0.399** 0.547*** 0.547*** 0.519*** 0.040***
(0.047) (0.183) (0.192) (0.192) (0.178) (0.016)
TFPR -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.219*** -0.016*** -0.012***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.031) (0.004) (0.002)
Number of Employees -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.127*** -0.009*** -0.008***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.033) (0.003) (0.001)
Age 0.016 0.016 0.020** 0.001* 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000)
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Preferential Tariffs 0.030 0.030 0.044 0.002 0.002
(0.042) (0.042) (0.047) (0.002) (0.002)
MFN Tariff Cut (1999) -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 0.001 0.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.002) (0.000)
Constant -1.080*** -1.116*** -0.834*** -0.543*** 0.714 0.374***
(0.018) (0.150) (0.220) (0.194) (0.484) (0.032)
Observations 144,479 144,474 144,097 144,097 144,097 144,097 129,909
R-squared 0.218 0.641
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES YES YES YES NO
Business control NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Trends NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Firm FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
FracReg
Firm Profitability
OLS
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Fractional outcome regressions (columns 1-5) and OLS regressions (columns 6-7) with
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The outcome variable is firm profitability
(measured as PCM). The main independent variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut
and POE.
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firm profitability for POE, but not for SOE (Table A23 and Figure A11 in the appendix). These
results are in line with what Brandt et al (2017) find in China. However, these results are sensitive to
the use of entropy balancing and to the inclusion of firm fixed effects. That is, the positive effect of
input tariff cuts on firm profitability for POEs is no longer significant when we use entropy balancing
and include firm fixed effects. Note that the interaction between MFN tariff cut (i.e. output tariff
cuts) and POE remains generally significant, even though the number of observations is substantively
smaller.
3.2 Industry-Level Analysis
Main Variables and Sample. We now move to the industry-level analysis to test the effect of
Vietnam’s accession to the WTO on productivity of POE-dominated and SOE-dominated industries.
The dependent variables are two time-varying measures of productivity. The first measure of produc-
tivity are the Solow’s residuals as described above (TFPR). The second measure of producitivty is
estimated using Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology.43 We label this second variable Olley & Pakes.
For both measures, we calculate the weighted average value of productivity for all firms f operating
in industry i in time t.44 Note that TFPR and Olley & Pakes reports data at the beginning of the
year.
Our main independent variables are MFN tariff cuts, a dummy for the SOE-dominated sectors,
and their interaction. While we have already described the first variable, i.e., ∆τi,t, remember that
SOE-dominated Sector is a dummy scoring one if an industry has more than 40% of workers employed
in SOEs. We use the percentage of workers in the pre-WTO accession period, i.e,. in 2006 and 2007.45
The larger SOE labor share is, the more an industry is “owned” by the state.46 As we showed above,
both POEs and SOEs operate in the vast majority of industries. Therefore, we are unable to compare
industries in which only SOEs operate and for which we have data, as we would be left with only a
few industries.47
We estimate a sample of 620 industries (ISIC 4-digit) between 2006 and 2012, for which data on
tariffs are available.48 We rely on OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered by industry
at the ISIC 4-digit level for our baseline models. As in the case of firm profitability, not controlling
to measure input for all industries and so we lose a large number of observations. Moreover, the Vietnamese input-output
tables are available only at the 2-digit level, whereas output tariffs are available at the 4-digit level.
43We incorporate MFN tariff cuts and the dummy for POE into the inversion step of the Olley-Pakes-type productivity
estimation. This approach is similar to Amit and Konings (2007) and De Loecker (2013). Our results are not sensitive
to the inclusion of these variables in the inversion step of the productivity estimation.
44The average value of each firm-level variable is weighted by share of firm size by industry, i.e., number of employees.
We rely on size rather than revenue for the same reason that we explained above: POEs tend to under-report sales to
evade taxes (whereas SOEs do not). Therefore weighting on revenue would lead us to under-estimate POEs in moving
from firm-year to industry-year as unit of analysis.
45Tariff cuts kick in after 2007 in our sample. Results are similar if we use data of workers (employed in SOEs) reported
at the beginning of the year or at the end of the year.
46Results are similar if we use different thresholds, e.g., 35% or 45% of workers employed in SOEs.
47Given the distribution of the continuous measure of SOE labor share, using a dummy variable to identify SOE-
dominated sectors seems appropriate (Figure A12).
48We are able to estimate up to 117 industries in a given year. There are 120 industries at the 4-digit level, which would
result in 840 observations in seven years, 2006-2012. However, we have missing values for some covariates, which reduces
our total number of observations. Moreover, when we include the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand-side of the
model, we lose observations in the first year in which industries appear in the dataset. Since our dataset is unbalanced,
we lose not only observations in 2006, but also in subsequent years.
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for lagged productivity generates the potential problem of serial correlation. As such, we include a
lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of some models. In some estimates in which we
include a lagged dependent variable, we run GMM regressions that instrument the lagged dependent
variable with one lag (Arellano and Bond, 1991) to avoid Nickel bias (Nickel, 1981). Finally, we
double-difference both dependent and independent variables as a further way to take care of dynamic
panel estimation problems (Arellano and Honore´, 2001; Trefler, 2004).
Econometric Strategy. The challenges we face in the industry-level analysis are similar to those we
faced in the firm-level analysis. A first concern is that there are differences in the covariates observed
between SOE-dominated industries and POE-dominated industries, as shown in the descriptive section.
For instance, compared to POE-dominated industries, SOE-dominated industries tend (1) to be more
capital-rich industries; (2) to have a significantly lower number of firms; and (3) to have larger firms.
To tackle this issue, we again rely on entropy balancing. Specifically, we balance out a set of exogenous
covariates with the respect to SOE-dominated Sector. We can thus compare SOE-dominated sectors
with a comparable counterfactual of POE-dominated sectors, running our main models with the
weights obtained from entropy balancing.49
Second, similar to the firm-level analysis, we include Trefler (2004) business condition controls. In
this case, the business conditions controls are built by regressing TFPRi,t over Vietnam’s GDP, and
the real interest rate, including industry and year fixed effects. These regressions generate a time-
varying industry-specific prediction (T̂FPR) of the effect of business conditions on the WTO-period
productivity. Hence, we include these values on the right-hand side of the models. Third, we include
an industry-specific (2-digit) time trend to check if the parallel trend assumption holds.
Productivity. Formally, we estimate the following main model:
TFPRi,t = ζ0 + ζ1SOE − dominated Sectori,pre−WTO + ζ2∆τi,t−1+
ζ3SOE − dominated Sectori,pre−WTO ×∆τi,t−1 + ζ4Xi,t + δi + δt + ǫi,t,
(3)
where the key coefficient of interest is ζ3. X includes a set of control variables at the industry level.
More specifically, we control for (logged) values of imports at the industry level, for the number of
POEs and SOEs operating in each industry. Furthermore, we include the proportion of POEs and
SOEs exiting the market in each industry. In addition, we control for average firm age, the logged
number of employees and profit, the percentage of capital owned by the state in POEs, and the
capital-labor ratio, which are calculated as weighted average values for all the firms operating in a
given industry i.50 Furthermore, we include 2-digit industry fixed effects δi.
The interaction between SOE-dominated Sector and MFN tariff cuts is always negative and sta-
tistically significant in every model (see Table 4). Moreover, the coefficient of ∆τ is always positive
49We balance POE with respect to the following variables: logged number of employees, log of profit, log of exports,
level of tariff prior WTO accession, number of POEs and SOEs operating in each industry, capital-labor ratio, and
average firm age. Our results hold if we use propensity score matching instead of entropy balancing, though we lose a
large number of observations.
50Table A2 in the appendix shows descriptive statistics of all the variables described above.
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and significant except in column 3. The effects of trade liberalization diverge strikingly from the
predictions of standard trade models with heterogeneous firms (e.g. Melitz, 2003). These findings
are in line with the ones of the firm-level analysis. Since the selection effect is null for SOEs, this
implies that, after trade liberalization, unproductive SOEs do not exit the market differently from
unproductive POEs. In turn, SOE-dominated industries do not experience the same productivity
kick as POE-dominated industries. Moreover, we note that the coefficient of controls are usually not
significant with the exception of Number of Employees whose coefficient is negative and signiticant
throughout all models.
We implement further tests to corroborate our findings. First, our results are similar if we include
industry-specific trends (columns 3 and 6), which is a very demanding test. Second, our results hold
when we double first-difference, which is de facto equivalent to use 4-digit industry fixed effects (see
Table A24 in the appendix). Third, our results are robust to the inclusion of the lagged dependent
variable, which is often not significant, and run both OLS and GMM (Tables A25 and A26 in the
appendix). The fact that the lagged dependent variable is often not significant may be explained by
our relatively short time-span and by the fact that accession to the WTO has been a shock for the
Vietnamese economy. Fourth, our results hold if we use a continuous measure of SOE labor share
(pre-WTO values), instead of the 40% threshold, as showed in Table A27 in the appendix. Fifth, we
interact each of the controls with the post-accession dummy, i.e., Post-WTO. Results are reported in
Table A28 in the appendix and are very similar to the one showed above. Finally, Table A29 in the
appendix shows that results are similar if we use PSM rather than entropy balancing.
A counterfactual exercise. Our analysis has showed that the presence of SOEs tames selection,
competition, and productivity effects of trade. Although our reduced-form empirical approach does
not allow us to account for general equilibrium interactions, we can use regression coefficients to
perform partial equilibrium calculations and get a sense of the magnitude of the foregone productivity
gains from trade due to the presence of SOEs.
We start showing the overall productivity gains from the accession to the WTO (see Table 5).
We rely on the coefficient estimates in column 1 of Table 4, and focus on POE-dominated industries
(i.e., SOE-dominated Sector = 0). We then estimate (i) the linear predictions of POE-dominated
industries with zero tariff cuts and (ii) the linear predictions of POE-dominated industries with tariff
reductions greater than zero in the post-WTO period. Then, we take the average value of these two
linear predictions across industries and years and calculate their growth rate. By dividing this growth
rate by the number of years, we obtain our annual productivity growth in the post-WTO period,
2008-2012. In these industries, the post-WTO tariff reductions produce an annual increase in TFPR
of 9.2%. Since these industries account for about 40% of Vietnam’s manufacturing output, the annual
overall manufacturing productivity increases by 3.7%, a result in line with Trefler (2004) and Trefler
and Lileeva (2010). This effect is substantive, but not particularly remarkable, given the importance
of accessing the WTO for a small closed economy.51
To get a sense of the loss of efficiency produced by a strong SOE presence, we implement the
following simulations. We estimate the linear predictions of SOE-dominated industries facing positive
51Trefler (2004) looks at the effect of a single preferential trade agreements between Canada and the US on those two
large open economies.
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Table 4: TFPR, MFN tariff cuts, and SOE-dominated Sectors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SOE-dominated 0.163 0.163 0.213** -0.114* -0.114* -0.121
(0.103) (0.103) (0.093) (0.063) (0.063) (0.074)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.013 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.035***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
SOE-dominated*MFN Tariff Cut -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.024*** -0.015* -0.015* -0.015**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Number of Employees -0.292*** -0.292*** -0.328*** -0.225*** -0.225*** -0.220**
(0.044) (0.044) (0.062) (0.079) (0.079) (0.084)
Capital-labor ratio 0.174 0.174 0.168 0.270*** 0.270*** 0.224***
(0.123) (0.123) (0.131) (0.064) (0.064) (0.061)
Age -0.016* -0.016* -0.017* 0.006 0.006 0.007*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
POE Exit Rate -0.386 -0.386 -0.109 -0.118 -0.118 0.135
(0.350) (0.350) (0.393) (0.325) (0.325) (0.347)
SOE Exit Rate 0.661*** 0.661*** 0.633** 0.000 0.000 -0.039
(0.210) (0.210) (0.243) (0.249) (0.249) (0.185)
Export -0.002 -0.002 -0.012 0.000 0.000 0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Profit 0.077 0.077 0.167* -0.078 -0.078 -0.113
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.100) (0.100) (0.131)
Number of POES 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of SOEs 0.001 0.001 0.008** 0.000 0.000 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
MFN Tariff Cut (1999) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006** -0.006** -0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Constant -0.016 -20.604** -0.923 1.311*** 6.568 2.118***
(0.946) (8.113) (1.118) (0.419) (7.800) (0.699)
Observations 620 620 620 620 620 620
R-squared 0.665 0.665 0.721 0.781 0.781 0.811
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing YES YES YES YES YES YES
Business control NO YES NO NO YES NO
Trends NO NO YES NO NO YES
OLS
TFPR Olley & Pakes
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by HS 4-digit The outcome variables are
TFPR and Olley & Pakes. The main independent variable is the interaction between MFN
Tariff Cut and SOE-dominated Sector.
24
Table 5: Productivity gains with and without SOE-dominated sectors.
POE-dominated Sector
∆τ =0 → ∆τ > 0 Output Annual aggregate gains
Annual gains 9.2% 40% 3.7%
Couterfactual analysis : ∆τ > 0
SOE-dominated → POE-dominated Output Annual aggregate gains
Annual gains 7.9% 7% 0.6%
tariff cuts (i.e. ∆τ > 0). Next, we build our counterfactual by replacing the value of SOE-dominated
Sector with zero and then estimating a second set of the linear predictions. In other words, we estimate
what, according to our empirical model, would have been the effect of trade liberalization on TFPR if
the industries with high presence of SOEs had been replaced by the same industries but with low or no
presence of SOEs. As before, we take the average value of these two linear predictions across industries
and years. Finally, we calculate the growth rate of the two average values (i.e., when SOE-dominated
Sector = 1 and SOE-dominated Sector = 0) to capture the lower productivity gains from trade in
industries with a large presence of SOEs.
Table 5 shows the result of this simulation. The average overall productivity gains would have
been 7.9% larger in a counterfactual Vietnamese economy without SOE-dominated sectors. Thus,
in the period between 2008 and 2012, the overall productivity gains would have been 40% larger in
a counterfactual economy where POEs replace SOEs, i.e. 7.9% multiplied by the 5 years in which
Vietnam has been a WTO member. Since SOE-dominated industries account for 7% of Vietnam’s
manufacturing output, the annual overall manufacturing productivity would have been increased by
an extra 0.6% by replacing SOE-dominated industries with POE-dominated industries. In sum, we
find that the presence of SOEs has substantively hampered productivity growth in Vietnam after the
accession to the WTO.
4 Exploring the Mechanisms
We provide some economic intuition for our results through the lenses of a model of trade with
firm heterogeneity. The main purpose of the model is to suggests theoretical interpretations of the
empirical results and to guide us to test specific transmission mechanisms driving the different response
of SOEs and POEs to trade openness. The model is an extension of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) (MO
henceforth) along the following dimensions: first, we devise the model in a small open economy
setting to better represent the experience of Vietnam joining the WTO. Second, we introduce credit
constraints on the sunk entry cost. Third, we allow for two types of firms, SOEs and POEs, differing
in the extent of credit constraints and in non-pecuniary entry barriers. Finally we add fixed operating
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costs which are also subject to different credit constraints for SOEs and POEs.
Paying a sunk entry cost firms draw an efficiency level which determines their decision to produce
for the domestic and for the export market. We assume that firms borrow to finance the entire entry
cost and that they face credit constraints on this activity. Financial institutions can expect to be payed
the full firm profit with probability φ < 1, or only a fraction te ∈ (0, 1) of it with probability (1− φ).
Following the evidence presented in Section 2, we assume that POEs are more credit constrained than
SOEs: φy < φg, where subindex y indicates private firms and g SOEs.
Closed economy. Households have the following preferences
U = qc0 +
Sg∑
j=1
βgjGj +
Sy∑
j=1
βyjYj ,
where qc0 is an outside good, βg and βy are utility weights, G and Y are bundles of SOEs and POEs-
produced goods respectively, with
Gj = α
∫ Ngj
0
gcijdi−
γ
2
∫ Ngj
0
(
gcij
)2
di− η
2
(∫ Ngj
0
gcijdi
)2
,
Yj = α
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0
ycijdi−
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∫ Nyj
0
(
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2
(∫ Nyj
0
ycijdi
)2
,
and Sg and Sy are the mass of SOEs and POEs sectors. Parameter γ pins down substitutability across
varieties and η > 0 substitutability between the homogeneous good and the differentiated varieties,
and N denotes the mass of varieties of each type of good.52 Solving the household problem the demand
for each variety reads
gij ≡ Lgcij =
αL
ηNgj + γ
− L
γ
pigj
βgj
+
ηNgj
ηNgj + γ
L
γ
pgj
βgj
, (4)
yij ≡ Lycij =
αL
ηNyj + γ
− L
γ
piyj
βyj
+
ηNyj
ηNyj + γ
L
γ
pyj
βyj
,
where pgj and pyj are the average prices of SOEs and POEs goods respectively in sector j, and L is
population size.
All SOEs and POEs solve similar and separable problems in all sectors, we report only one of them
for brevity and ignore the sector index. At entry, firms draw a cost level c to produce a particular
variety from a given distribution G(C). Identifying each variety i with its cost draw c, a POE choses
a price p(c) to max profits πy (c) = (p (c)− c) y (c) subject to the demand (4). The solution to this
problem allows us to derive the cost cutoff cDy above which producing is not profitable and firms do
not operate πy (cDy) = 0,
cDy =
αβyγ
ηNy + γ
+
ηNy
ηNy + γ
py. (5)
The cutoff depends on the mass of firms operating in the sector and on the average price level, as in the
standard MO model. In this economy selection depends on the degree of product market competition
52The separability of all sectors in the utility is needed to preserve some tractability in the comparative statics.
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which responds endogenously to policy changes. The markup for any firm c can be written as
µy (c) = py (c)− c =
1
2
(cDy − c) , (6)
suggesting that a more competitive sector is also more selective.
Financial institutions pay the full entry cost FEy and expect πy with probability φy and teπy with
probability (1− φy). Competition among financial institutions leads to the free entry condition
πy =
∫ cDy
0
L
4γβy
(cDy − c)2 dG(c) =
FEy
φy + (1− φy) te
≡ FˆEy,
where Fˆey is the entry cost inclusive of the cost of borrowing, and πy is the expected profit at entry.
53
Higher credit constraints imply higher cost of borrowing to finance entry and therefore higher entry
costs. We assume that all SOEs and POEs face the same entry cost, FE = FEg = FEy, but POEs
are more credit constrained than SOEs, φy < φg. We also assume, for both types of firms, a Pareto
distribution of the cost parameter c, dG(c) = (k/cM ) (c/cM )
k−1, and setting cM = 1 for simplicity we
can write the free entry condition as,
b1c
k+2
Dy = FˆEy,
where b1 = L/ [2γβy (k + 2) (k + 1)]. It is easy to see that ∂cDy/∂FˆEy > 0. A higher sunk entry cost
makes the economy less selective and, as suggested by the markup expression (6), less competitive.
Hence, since ∂FˆEy/∂φy < 0, sectors with higher credit constraints face higher entry cost and therefore
are less competitive and less selective.
Small open economy. Consider now a small open economy trading with the rest of the world at
an iceberg cost τ > 1. Following Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2013), the small open economy
assumption requires that Foreign demand for Home goods is not affected by changes in the Home
country. This boils down to assume that Foreign demand for Home goods takes the form, A−Bpj (c)
for j = g, y, where A and B are exogenously given. Similar to domestic firms, exporters face credit
constraints on the entry cost, pinned down by φ.
The problem for non-exporting firms is identical to the one in closed economy yielding the same
cutoff cDy as in (5), while exporters’ equilibrium yields the export cost cutoff
cXy =
1
τ∗
(
A
B
)
, (7)
where τ∗ is the iceberg trade cost to sell in the Foreign country. The free entry condition in open
economy writes
∫ cDy
0
πDy(c)dGc+
∫ cXy
0
πXy(c)dGc =
FEy
φy + (1− φy) te
≡ FˆEy,
where the profit on domestic sales πDy(c) = πy (c) is the same as in autarky. After some manipulations
53Substituting the cutoff condition back into the profit function we can express the latter as, piy (c) =
L/ (4γβy) (cDy − c)
2.
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this condition can be written as,
cDy =
{
1
b1
[
FˆEy − ρb∗1
(
A
B
)k+1]} 1k+2
, (8)
where for simplicity we assume symmetric variable trade costs, τ∗ = τ , ρ = τ−k is a measure of
the “freeness” of trade, b∗1 = B/ [2 (k + 2) (k + 1)], and b1 is identical to that derived for the closed
economy. Using the free entry condition we can show that
∂cDy
∂ρ
= − (k + 2) c
k+1
k+2
Dy
b∗1
b1
(
A
B
)k+1
< 0. (9)
This is the standard selection effect of trade liberalization. In our model, as in MO, selection is driven
by the pro-competitive effect of trade on markups. Lower trade costs lead to entry of more domestic
and foreign firms, which in turn leads to lower markups and more selection.
The role of financial frictions in shaping the selection effect is derived as follows,
∂2cDy
∂ρ∂FˆEy
< 0, (10)
suggesting that trade-induced selection is stronger for firms facing higher credit constraints. Equation
6 suggests that, as in the standard MO model, markups and the survival cutoff are strictly related.
Consequently, trade liberalization has both a stronger pro-competitive and selection effect for more
credit constrained firms. Intuitively, high constraints imply high entry costs (∂FˆEy/∂φy < 0) which,
due to the positive relationship between markups and firm survival probability, lead to weak selection
and high markups. If markups are high, there is a large scope for trade to improve competition. As the
economy moves toward perfect competition, the pro-competitive effect of trade tends to disappear,
and with it the selection effect vanishes as well. Hence, the pro-competitive and selection effects
of trade are stronger for firms operating in markets where competition before opening is less fierce.
Finally, as in the standard MO model, the average productivity in this economy is the inverse of the
average cost: c¯−1y = (k − 1) cDy/k for POEs and c¯−1g = (k − 1) cDg/k for SOEs. Hence the stronger
the pro-competitive and selection effect of trade, the stronger the increase in productivity.
The model suggests that if firms face stronger financial constraints on entry costs, they are hit
harder by trade liberalization. Our empirical results in Section 3 show that the selection and compe-
tition effect of trade are stronger for POEs than for SOEs. If credit frictions are at the root of this
different response to trade openness, the model then suggests that this is because SOEs operate in
more competitive sectors than POEs. But this is at odds with the evidence presented in Section 2,
which shows that state-owned firms have higher markups and that SOE-dominated sectors are more
concentrated. These facts suggest that if anything, SOEs have higher market power and operate in
less competitive markets both before and after WTO entry. Hence, although pecuniary barriers to
entry due to credit constraints could play a role in affecting the pro-competitive and selection effects
of trade for private firms, something else is driving the difference between POEs and SOEs. 54
54A straightforward extension of the model with different POEs sectors facing different credit constraints would generate
the prediction that more credit constrained POEs face stronger competition.
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We posit that barriers to entry of a different nature could play a role. In those sectors dominated
by SOEs, political barriers to entry, unrelated to the financial costs to start up a firm, such as regula-
tions, preferential access to public procurement and barriers due to national security issues can grant
firms a strong protection from both domestic and foreign competition. These barriers can be easily
incorporated in our model by assuming that in SOEs sectors entry is politically restricted. This is
equivalent to the short-run version of the MO model and leads to similar results. Fixing the mass of
entrants to N¯ge we can express the mass of active SOEs as Ng = N¯geG (cDg) = N¯gec
k
Dg. The cutoff
condition (5) becomes
cDg =
αβgγ
ηN¯geckDg + γ
+
ηN¯gec
k
Dg
ηN¯geckDg + γ
pg (cDg) ,
which is independent of the trade cost and, as a consequence, trade liberalization affects neither
selection nor competition.55 The stark form of entry restriction considered here leads to a very simple
result: when the mass of potential (domestic and foreign) entrants cannot respond to market incentives,
because it is restricted by domestic regulation, changes in trade costs cannot affect either the degree
of product market competition or selection. Hence in an economy where selection and product market
competition are tied together, regulatory entry barriers and the pecuniary barriers generated by credit
constraints on entry costs have different implications for the impact of trade. When credit frictions
leads to high monetary entry costs but entry is not restricted, trade has large competitive and selection
effects. When instead entry is strongly regulated, the market mechanism breaks down and with it the
efficiency gains triggered by trade liberalization vanish.
Summing up, our model shows that political barriers to entry are a good candidate to explain the
different response of SOEs to trade liberalization, both in terms of selection and competition. It also
suggests that credit constrains could be a source of heterogeneity in the response of POEs operating
in different sectors.
Constraints on fixed operating costs. So far we have provided economic intuition for the different
response of POEs and SOEs based on the assumption that these firms operate in separate sectors,
competing only horizontally, with competition regulated by the fixed utility weights. This assumption
was motivated by the evidence presented in Section 2 suggesting that SOEs have higher profitability
and that sectors where they have a dominant presence show higher market concentration. Although
this assumption has empirical bite, reality is less stark and there are many sectors where POEs and
SOEs compete head to head. In these circumstances, neither pecuniary nor regulatory entry barriers
can explain the different behaviour of these two types of firms. The different response of POEs and
SOEs could then be determined by barriers to exit. It is plausible to think that preferential access to
credit can allow SOEs to weather the storm of foreign competition better than private firms. A simple
way to incorporate this mechanism is to introduce fixed operating costs, periodic expenses unrelated
55Here we are assuming that entry in these SOE-dominated sectors is restricted for both domestic and foreign firms.
The foreign export cutoff into the home country in SOEs sectors can be shown to be cXg = (1/τ) cDg. Hence, as in
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the distribution of prices is the same as in the closed economy and the explicit expression
for the average price is
p¯g =
2k + 1
2k + 2
cDg.
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with the volume of production and sales, such as rental cost of land use, office space, equipment,
licences, etc. These expenses have an important role for selection and exit (e.g. Hopenhayn, 1992,
Melitz, 2003), and they often have to be incurred previous to production and sales. Although the
assumption of SOEs and POEs operating in different sectors is not needed to analyse barriers to exit,
as we make clear below, we keep it in this extension with fixed operating cost in order to have a
framework in which credit constraints can affect the entry and exit margin for both types of firms.
We follow Manova (2013) and assume that while variable costs can be funded internally, firms
must pay a fraction d ∈ (0, 1) of their fixed operating costs λ upfront. In order to cover this upfront
cost, firms borrow from financial institutions pledging a fraction t ∈ (0, 1) as collateral, with t < d,
implying that the loan is larger than the collateral.56 Higher d and lower t indicate stronger financial
vulnerability of the firm or sector. Because of imperfect financial contractibility credit institutions
can expect to be repaid by firms with probability δ ∈ (0, 1), which embodies the strength of financial
institutions or their willingness to enforce credit contracts. The role of credit frictions can be easily
shown analyzing how different values of the contractibility parameter δ affect trade-induced selection
and reallocation. We assume that POEs are more credit constrained than SOEs on fixed operating
costs as well: δy < δg.
The model has the same structure as the baseline model described above and we only present the
essential new features leaving the detailed description and derivation to the appendix. The survival
cutoff now becomes,
cDy =
αβyγ
ηNy + γ
+
ηNy
ηNy + γ
py − 2
√
βyγλˆy
L
, (11)
where λˆy = [1 + (1− δy) (d− t) /δy]λ is the fixed operating cost augmented for the cost of financing
it externally. Since d > t, stronger credit constraints, lower δ, imply a higher cost of borrowing and,
as a consequence, a higher fixed operating cost. The markup for firm c is
µy (c) = py (c)− c =
1
2
(cDy − c) + 2
√
γλˆyβy
L
. (12)
Assuming for simplicity λX = λ, then λˆXy = λˆy, the free entry condition can be written as
b1c
k+2
Dy + b2
√
λˆyc
k+1
Dy + ρb
∗
1c
k+2
Xy + ρb
∗
2
√
λˆyc
k+1
Xy = FˆEy, (13)
where b1 and b2 are constants defined in the appendix, and cXy = (1/τ)
(
A/B − 2
√
λˆy/B
)
is also a
constant. It is easy to show that a higher fixed operating cost leads to more selection, ∂cDy/∂λˆy < 0.
We also find that higher credit constraints on fixed operating costs lead to a weaker selection effect of
trade,
56In purchasing intermediate inputs, paying salaries to workers, and paying rents for land use and equipment, firms
often have to incur in expenses previous to production and sales.
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∂2cDy
∂ρ∂δy
= −

 ∂
2F
∂ρ∂δy
∂F
∂cDy
− ∂2F
∂cDy∂δy
∂F
∂ρ(
∂F
∂cDy
)2

 < 0, (14)
where F = b1c
k+2
Dy + b2
√
λˆyc
k+1
Dy + ρb
∗
1c
k+2
Xy + ρb
∗
2
√
λˆXyc
k+1
Xy − FˆEy is the free entry condition. Since
POEs are likely to be more credit constrained than SOEs (as we will see later), constraints on fixed
operating costs cannot explain the different response of SOEs and POEs to trade. This suggests that a
different mechanism is driving the differential effect of trade on exit between SOEs and POEs observed
in the data.
Access to credit can be used by SOEs to soften budget constraints when challenged by a more
competitive environment, such as the post-WTO economy. As we saw above, by reducing the fixed
operating cost, easier access to credit leads to lower selection and this can potentially offset the
selection effect of trade. Considering the financial friction parameters δg as a policy parameter, banks
can weaken the constraints on SOEs credit for those firms going under in the post-WTO, thereby
essentially bailing them out. Hence, we observe a weaker fall in markups and less exit for SOEs
not because their level of credit constraints on fixed operations is lower than POEs before trade
liberalization, but because SOEs can soften these constraints when liberalization hits them. Notice
that this result would hold even if we remove the assumption that SOEs and POEs compete in different
sectors. In fact, if we assume that these firms compete vertically, the number of firms and average
price in (11) will not differ for POEs and SOEs and the cutoffs difference will be uniquely pinned
down by the different cost of accessing credit leading to different fixed operating costs. It follows that
the bailout via credit operates similarly to the benchmark model.
Taking stock, the model delivers three predictions suggestive of economic mechanisms which can
contribute to explain our empirical findings.
i. Barriers to entry I. POEs facing high entry barriers due to credit constrains, therefore oper-
ating in less competitive markets, experience stronger competition and selection effects of trade.
ii. Barriers to entry II. Pecuniary barriers to entry cannot explain the different response of SOEs
and POEs to trade, but political barriers to entry can.
iii. Barriers to exit. The neutrality of SOEs’ selection and profitability to trade liberalization is
produced by a bail-out mechanism via credit supply.
The economic intuition for (i) is that if firms find it difficult to borrow to enter the market, product
market competition is low and there is a large scope for trade to affect it, thereby generating large
selection effects. Result (ii) allows us to exclude the hypothesis that preferential access to credit to
finance entry drives SOEs’ response and suggests that if entry barriers play a role in shaping SOEs
performance they are most likely of a political/bureaucratic nature. Result (iii) shows that the credit
channel can still play a role in explaining the different response of SOEs and POEs to trade if we
consider financial constraints on fixed operating costs and assume that the government can use credit
to help SOEs weather the trade shock.
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5 Testing the Theoretical Mechanisms
Next, we provide some broad tests of the predictions of the model.57 First, we check whether POEs
operating in less competitive sectors experience a stronger selection effect after WTO entry. Second,
we explore the hypothesis that the entry margin responds positively to trade liberalization for POEs
but not for SOEs. These are both indirect tests of the predictions that entry barriers, pecuniary or
regulatory, shape the effects of trade on selection. Finally, we ask whether access to cheap credit is
important in affecting the different response of POEs and SOEs to trade. This provides broad tests
of both the role of credit constraint as generating barriers to entry and to exit.
Exit and Market Concentration. One implication of the model is that POEs should experience
a stronger selection effect of trade if they operate in less competitive markets. To test this prediction,
we use market concentration, captured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman index of revenue (HHIi,2006),
and we interact it with ∆τ . Since market concentration is affected by trade liberalization, we use a
baseline value of HHI, i.e. its pre-WTO accession value in 2006.58 In this analysis, we restrict the
sample to POEs, as the model suggests that cross-sector variation in pre-WTO competition is likely
to affect these firms’ response to trade. More specifically, we test the following model:
Pr(Exitfi,t = 1) = κ0+κ1HHIi,2006+κ2∆τi,t−1+κ3HHIi,2006×∆τi,t−1+κ4Xfi,t+κ5Wi,t+δi+δt+ǫfi,t,
(15)
where δi are industry (HS 2-digit) fixed effects to account for heterogeneity across products, and δt are
year fixed effects. Since HHIi,2006 does not change over time, i.e. it has 2006 baseline values, we are
unable to control for industry (HS 4-digit) fixed effects as in the previous models. The key coefficient
of interest is κ3, which should be positive. X and W are vectors including, respectively, firm-level and
industry-level covariates. We run OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the level of the
firm.
Table A30 in the appendix shows that the probability of exiting the market increases with the
combination of MFN tariff cuts and market concentration. Indeed, the interaction term is positive
and significant in every estimates, even when we include industry specific trends (2-digit). Figure
7 shows that the marginal effect of tariff cuts on the probability of exiting the market is not sig-
nificant when HHIi,2006 is lower than 0.2, whereas it becomes positive and significant for value of
HHIi,2006 higher than 0.2. In sum, in case of trade liberalization, POEs operating in uncompetitive
industries, i.e. high-concentrated industries, are more likely to exit the market than POEs operating
in competitive markets, which is in line with prediction (i) of the model.59 The full mechanism of the
model suggests that entry barriers due to credit constraints on fixed operating costs leading to more
concentrated markets increase the competition and selection effect of trade. Although we cannot test
the full mechanism, as we cannot distinguish in the data whether firms are constrained on credit for
57The tests are only broadly validating the predictions of the model due to data limitations and to the fact that our
reduce-form approach does not allow a full structural validation of the theoretical mechanisms.
58By doing so, we lose these industries whose data is not available in 2006. That is why the sample size shrinks in this
analysis.
59In the appendix (Table A31) we show that the interaction between tariff cuts and market concentration is never
significant for SOEs, in line with our model.
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Figure 7: The effect of MFN tariff cuts and market concentration on POEs’ exit.
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Note: The predictions are plotted from column 1 in Table A22. OLS regression with industry
(4-digit) fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The histogram shows
the distribution of HHIi,2006. 95% C.I.
entry or fixed operating costs, below we show that more credit constrained POEs experience stronger
competition and selection effects of trade.
Barriers to Entry. Another insight of the model is that if SOEs are protected by political barriers
to entry while POEs are not, we should observe WTO to have a positive effect on entry of POEs but
not of SOEs. Although we cannot identify the exact source of barriers to entry in the data, we can test
whether WTO induces more entry for POEs than for SOEs. Precisely, we use the following model:
Pr(Entryfi,t = 1) = λ0+λ1POEfi+λ2∆τi,t−1+λ3POEfi×∆τi,t−1+λ4Xfi,t+λ5Wi,t+δi+δt+ ǫfi,t,
(16)
where δi are industry (HS 4-digit) fixed effects to account for heterogeneity across products, and δt
are year fixed effects. The key coefficient of interest is λ3, which should be positive. X and W are
vectors including, respectively, firm-level and industry-level covariates. We control for the same set of
confounding factors as for Exit.60 We run OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the level
of the firm.
Table A32 in the appendix shows that the probability of entering the market increases with MFN
tariff cuts for POEs, whereas it does not increase for SOEs, as can be observed from the positive sign
of the coefficient of the interaction term (i.e., POE and ∆τ). Importantly, the interaction term is
significant in every estimates, even when we include industry-year fixed effects and industry specific
trends (4-digit). As with previous analyses, to ease the interpretation of the interaction terms, we
60Table A3 in the appendix shows descriptive statistics of all the variables described below.
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Figure 8: POE vs. SOE: the effect of MFN tariff cuts on firm’s entry.
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Note: The predictions are plotted from column 2 in Table A32. OLS regression with industry
(4-digit) fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The histogram
shows the distribution of ∆τ . 95% C.I.
rely on Figure 8, which shows the probability of entering the market for POEs and SOEs at different
levels of tariff cuts. While the entry rate for POEs increases with the magnitude of the MFN cuts,
the same is not true for SOEs, which display a negative slope.
Credit constraints. Our model suggests that credit constraints can be a source of variation in
firms’ response to trade openness, both within POEs and between POEs and SOEs. If two firms need
to finance externally the same percentage of the fixed operating costs or the same entry investment, the
firm with a preferential access to credit can borrow at a cheaper rate. Hence, the same amount of debt
has a different impact on the fixed costs for firms with different access to credit. The model predicts
that credit constraints on entry costs can contribute to explain the effect of trade on competition and
selection for POEs. While credit constraints on fixed operating costs can contribute to explain the
differential response of POEs and SOEs.
Here we provide some broad tests of these predictions. We begin with including the triple interac-
tion term among POE, Firm Debt, and ∆τ , where Firm Debt is the difference between total capital
used by firms and capital owned by firms divided by capital used not to over-estimate capital-intensive
sectors.61 The idea is to explore whether firm debt has a different impact on the post-liberalization
exit probability for POEs and SOEs. Firm Debt is not necessarily a proxy for credit constraints or
the cost of credit. Higher levels of debt could signal that a firm has good access to credit, or that it is
61The variable Firm Debt is available only for the period 2006-2010.
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highly constrained and accumulates higher debt because it is charged higher borrowing rates. Our test
sheds some light on this issue: if high Firm Debt proxies high credit constraints we would observe the
positive effect of debt on post-WTO exit, otherwise we would see the opposite result. More formally,
we estimate the following model:
Pr(Exitfi,t = 1) = µ0 + µ1POEfi,t + µ2∆τi,t−1 + µ3Firm Debtfi,t + µ4POEfi,t ×∆τi,t−1
+ µ5POEfi,t × Firm Debtfi,t + µ6∆τi,t−1 ×Debtfi,t
+ µ7POEfi,t ×∆τi,t−1 × Firm Debtfi,t + µ8Xfi,t + µ9Wi,t + δi + δt + ǫfi,t,
(17)
where the key coefficient of interest is µ7. As is common practice with a triple interaction term,
we include double interaction terms for each combination of POE, ∆τ , and Debt. We include the
same controls X and W as in equation (16), since the outcome variable is the same. Moreover, we
use entropy balancing to balance out POEs and SOEs with respect to exogenous variables (including
capital-labor ratio and assets) in line with our identification strategy in equation (16). We run OLS
regressions with standard errors clustered at the level of the firm.62 Results of equation (17) are
reported in Table A33 (column 1) in the appendix. The coefficient of the triple interaction term is
positive and significant, indicating that Firm Debt increases the probability of leaving the market
after trade liberalization for POEs, but not for SOEs.63 The crucial test is reported in Figure 9, which
refers to model 4 and plots the marginal effect of MFN tariff cuts on the probability of exiting. A
given level of debt ratio increases the post-liberalization probability of exiting for POEs but not for
SOEs. Moreover, a higher debt ratio is associated with more exit for POEs but not for SOEs.
These results support the hypothesis that high Firm Debt is a proxy of credit constraints. More-
over, they provide support to the model’s prediction that for a given level of borrowing has makes
it harder for POEs to survive trade liberalization while it has no effect on SOEs’ exit rates. The
model suggests that this different behaviour is due to different borrowing costs faced by POEs and
SOEs. To provide further support on the model’s prediction, we ask whether trade openness affects
the evolution of the cost of credit differentially for POEs and SOEs. To measure Cost of Credit, we
rely on a measure of interest expenses, which we divide by debt so to have a measure of the borrowing
cost. We estimate the following model:
Cost of Creditfi,t = ν0 + ν1POEfi,t + ν2∆τi,t−1 + ν3POEfi,t ×∆τi,t−1
+ ν4Xfi,t + δi + δt + ǫfi,t,
(18)
where Cost of Credit is measured as interest payments over debt, and the key coefficient of interest
is ν3, which we expect positive. In this model, we control for a dummy for foreign firms, value of the
assets, and the capital-labor ratio. We also include industry (4-digit) and year fixed effects. We run
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the level of the firm.
We report the regression results on Table A33 in the appendix (column 2). Here we focus on the
graphical representation of the results, which we report in Figure 10. For POEs, a higher tariff cut
62Our results are very similar if we rely on logit or probit modes, though we lose some observations due to incidental
parameter.
63Results are similar if we rely on survival analysis (Table A11 (Model 2)).
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Figure 9: POE vs SOE: The effect of firm’s debt on firm’s exit.
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Note: The predictions are plotted from column 1 in Table A33. OLS regression with industry
(4-digit) fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The histogram
shows the distribution of . 90% C.I.
is associated with a higher cost of credit, though the effect is not significant. On the contrary, as the
magnitude of tariff cuts increases for SOEs, the cost of credit decreases dramatically. This supports the
hypothesis that SOEs’ credit condition improves with trade liberalization, while the same is not true
for POEs. In line with our model where government can help SOEs face the trade-induced competition
shock by reducing the cost of borrowing to finance their fixed operating cost. Hence, this finding is
broadly compatible with the role of credit constraints as ‘de facto’ subsidies directly affecting the exit
margin.
Firm profitability. Although for data limitation our main empirical analysis focuses on the effects of
trade on selection, we perform a few broad tests of the model’s predictions for the effect of trade on firm
profitability. Our measure of profitability, computed as profits over revenues is too crude to distinguish
the effect of trade on pure firm profitability (markups) from its effect on the cost of capital/credit.
The negative effect of trade on POEs’ profitability shown in Figure 6 could be produced by a reduction
in firms’ market power and/or by an increase in the cost of credit. Similarly the neutrality of trade
for SOEs profitability could be compatible with a reduction in markups compensated by a reduction
in the cost of credit. To address this point we recompute our measure of profitability subtracting
interest payments from profits. The results in Figure A13 confirm our finding from the baseline
specification. POEs’ profitability is negatively affected by trade liberalization while the effects on
SOEs’ profitability are not significative. This suggests that the different effects of trade on SOEs and
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Figure 10: POE vs. SOE: The effect of trade liberalization on the cost of credit.
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(4-digit) fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The histogram
shows the distribution of . 90% C.I.
POEs profitability are driven by the different impact of trade on these firms’ market power. Moreover,
this is consistent with the theoretical prediction that political/bureaucratic barriers to entry neutralise
the pro-competitive effect of trade for SOEs.
Finally, we have repeated the regression in Table 3 restricting the sample to those sectors where
both POEs and SOEs are present, that is to say, we have excluded the sectors dominated by SOEs
which presumably are those more likely experiencing political/bureaucratic entry barriers. As shown
in Table A34, the neutrality of trade for SOEs profits is confirmed even for this subsample where the
degree of product market competition faced by SOEs can potentially be affected by trade. This is
further evidence that the credit channel could be playing an important role in sectors where SOEs
and POEs face similar barriers to entry.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed the effects of the 2007 WTO entry on Vietnamese firms. Our analysis
shows that the post-WTO probability of exiting the market is much larger for private firms than for
state-owned firms. Moreover, while we find a strong pro-competitive effect of WTO entry on POEs
profitability, SOEs profitability is unaffected by the trade reform. In the industry-level analysis, we
show that trade liberalization generates sizable productivity gains in industries with a strong presence
of POEs, while the gains are missing in industries dominated by SOEs. A simple counterfactual
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exercise suggests that the aggregate productivity gains from trade in the five years after Vietnam’s
accession to the WTO would have been 66% higher if SOEs would have been replaced by private firms.
A model of trade under firm heterogeneity suggests that barriers to entry and credit constraints
could be at the root of the different response of POEs and SOEs to trade liberalization. If entry is
regulated politically, the market mechanism breaks down and the effects of trade on selection and
competition are weakened. These efficiency effects of trade are instead more powerful if firm entry
faces pecuniary barriers, such as credit frictions. We provide broad tests of these model’s predictions
showing that while POEs’ entry responds positively to trade, market incentives do not work for SOEs’,
whose entry is not affected by trade. Moreover, POEs facing higher entry barriers (operating in less
competitive sectors), are less likely to survive trade liberalization. We also provide evidence that the
cost of credit drops substantially for SOEs after WTO entry, suggesting that bail-out via credit could
be driving the missing selection effect of trade for these firms.
The goal of this paper is to analyse the role of SOEs in shaping the efficiency gains from global-
ization. We focus exclusively on productivity gains, but it is likely that SOEs affect other outcomes
of globalization which have first order impact on a country’s welfare. In Vietnam, as in many other
developing countries, an important share of the economy operates informally, and also private firms
tend to evade taxes to an non-negligible extent (Tenev et al., 2003). A substantial presence of SOEs
then guarantees a solid flow of tax revenues, with important implications for public goods provision
and redistributive policies. Moreover, if large scale trade liberalization has temporary or permanent
negative effect on employment, in some areas or in the whole country (Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2013),
the presence of SOEs could help the economy smoothing the employment shock, thereby reducing the
damage and taming the welfare losses from globalization. These are interesting extensions of our
analysis that we leave for future research.
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Appendix: for Online Publication
A1. Model derivations
Closed economy. Here we provide a short derivation of the results of the model with fixed operating
costs, which represents a bigger departure from the MO structure. The POEs’ problem is
max
p(c)
πy (c) = (p (c)− c) y (c)− (1− d)λ− δyF (c)− (1− δy) tλ
s.t.
y (c) =
αL
ηNy + γ
− L
γ
p (c)
βy
+
ηNy
ηNy + γ
L
γ
py
βy
(19)
LC : (p (c)− c) y (c)− (1− d)λ ≥ F (c)
PC : − dλ+ δyF (c) + (1− δy) tλ ≥ 0.
The profit function shows that only a fraction (1− d) of the fixed cost is financed internally, and that
if the contract is enforced firms must pay F (c) to the financial institution, while in case of default
firms lose the collateral. The first constraint is the demand function, the liquidity constraint (LC)
implies that in case of repayment firms can pay up to their net revenues. The participation constraint
(PC) implies that the financial institution is willing to enter the contract only if the net expected
returns exceed the outside option, which for simplicity is normalised to zero.
The first order condition for the firm problem (19) gives
p (c) =
1
2
(
αγβy
ηNy + γ
+ c+
ηNy
ηNy + γ
py
)
. (20)
The optimal decision of firms is to adjust their payment F to take the investors to their participation
constraint, which in equilibrium holds with equality. Solving (PC) w.r.t. F (c), substituting it into
the (LC) taken as an equality and using the result that equilibrium profits gross of fixed costs are
(p (c)− c) y (c) = L
4γβy
(
αγ
ηNy + γ
+
ηNy
ηNy + γ
py − c
)2
we obtain the survival cutoff the survival cutoff
cDy =
αγβy
ηNy + γ
+
ηNy
ηNy + γ
py − 2
√
γλˆyβy
L
, (21)
where λˆy =
[
1 +
1−δy
δy
(d− t)
]
λ. Substituting it back into the equilibrium profit function we obtain
πy (c) =
L
4γβy

2
√
γλˆyβy
L
+ cDy − c


2
− λˆy.
The free entry condition follows from using the Pareto distribution for c.
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Small open economy. The decision to export is derived form the following problem,
max
p(c)
πXy (c) = (p (c)− τ∗c) yX (c)− (1− d)λX − δF (c)− (1− δy) tλX
s.t.
yX (c) = A−Bp (c) (22)
LC : (p (c)− τ∗c) yX (c)− (1− d)λ ≥ F (c)
PC : − dλX + δyF (c) + (1− δy) tλX ≥ 0.
The problem is similar to that of the closed economy and proceeding similarly we obtain the export
cutoff
cXy =
1
τ∗

A
B
− 2
√
λˆXy
B

 , (23)
where λˆXy =
[
1 +
1−δy
δy
(d− t)
]
λX , and the profit function can be written as
πXy (c) =
B
4
(
A
B
− τ∗c
)2
− λˆXy.
The free entry condition in open economy writes
∫ cDy
0
πDy(c)dGc+
∫ cXy
0
πXy(c)dGc =
FEy
φy + (1− φy) te
≡ FˆEy,
where the profit on domestic sales πDy(c) = πy (c) is the same as in autarky. After some manipulations
this condition can be written as,
b1c
k+2
Dy + b2
√
λˆyc
k+1
Dy + ρb
∗
1c
k+2
Xy + ρb
∗
2
√
λˆXyc
k+1
Xy = FˆEy,
where for simplicity we assume symmetric variable trade costs, τ∗ = τ , ρ = τ−k is a measure of the
“freeness” of trade, b∗1 = B/ [2γ (k + 2) (k + 1)], b
∗
2 =
√
B/ (k + 1), and b1 and b2 are identical to those
derived for the benchmark model in the main text. Using the implicit function theorem we obtain
∂cDy/∂λˆy = −
∂F/∂λˆy
∂F/∂cDy
< 0,
and
∂cDy
∂ρ
= −
∂F
∂ρ
∂F
∂cDy
= −
b∗1c
k+2
Xy + b
∗
2
√
λˆXyc
k+1
Xy
b1 (k + 2) c
k+1
Dy + b2 (k + 1)
√
λˆyckDy
< 0, (24)
where F = b1c
k+2
Dy + b2
√
λˆyc
k+1
Dy + ρb
∗
1c
k+2
Xy + ρb
∗
2
√
λˆXyc
k+1
Xy − FˆEy. Next we need to show that
∂2cDy
∂ρ∂δy
= −

 ∂
2F
∂ρ∂δy
∂F
∂cDy
− ∂2F
∂cDy∂δy
∂F
∂ρ(
∂F
∂cDy
)2

 < 0.
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Let λˆy = [1 + (1− δy) (d− t) /δy]λ = δ˜yλ and λˆXy = δ˜yλX , and assume λX = λ, then λˆXy = λˆy = δ˜yλ.
It is easy to show that
∂2F
∂ρ∂δy
= −δ˜′y2b∗2 (k + 1)λ (τcXy)k
√
δ˜y
B
> 0,
where δ˜
′
y = ∂δ˜y/∂δy = −δ−2y (d− t), and
∂2F
∂cDy∂δy
= b2 (k + 1)
√
λδ˜
′
yc
k
Dy < 0.
Since ∂F/∂cDy and ∂F/∂ρ are both positive it follows that ∂
2cDy/∂ρ∂δy < 0.
Using the free entry condition we can rewrite (24) as
∂cDy
∂ρ
= −
∂F
∂ρ
∂F
∂cDy
= −
(
FˆEy − b1ck+2Dy + b2
√
λˆyc
k+1
Dy
)
/ρ
b1 (k + 2) c
k+1
Dy + b2 (k + 1)
√
λˆyckDy
< 0.
We can also analyse the role of credit constrains on the entry cost:
∂2cDy
∂ρ∂φy
= −

 ∂
2F
∂ρ∂φy
∂F
∂cDy
− ∂2F
∂cDy∂φy
∂F
∂ρ(
∂F
∂cDy
)2

 > 0,
where ∂2F/∂cDy∂φy = 0 and ∂
2F/∂ρ∂φy = ρ
−1
(
FEy (t− 1) / [φy + (1− φy) t]2
)
< 0, as t < 1. This
confirms the result obtained in the economy without fixed operating costs.
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A2. Data
The data sources have been already described in the text, but we add some further details here.
• General Statistics Office of Vietnam : data include the entire sample of Vietnamese firms
that report their information to the GSO. The data do not include firms that operate in the
informal economy. The variables are reported in Vietnamese language and translated in English
by us. The trade categorisation of the survey follows ISICv4. We created a cross-walk from
the four-digit Vietnam Standard Industrial Classification (VSIC) and ISIC revision 3, and then
from ISIC revision 3 to 6-giti HS to merge the GSO data with tariff data.
• Import and export : data come from COMTRADE and are at the HS 6-digit level. To merge
6-digit COMTRADE data with 4-digit Vietnamese firm-level data, we take the average value of
import and export.
• MFN : data come from TRAINS (WITS) and are at the HS 6-digit level. To merge 6-digit
WTITS data with 4-digit Vietnamese firm-level data, we take the average value of MFN tariffs.
• US−Vietnam BTA : data come from TRAINS (WITS) and are at the HS 6-digit level. To
merge 6-digit COMTRADE data with 4-digit Vietnamese firm-level data, we take the average
value of preferential tariffs.
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A3. Other Figures and Tables
Figure A1: MFN tariff cuts after WTO accession.
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Note: The box plots report tariff cuts pre- and post-WTO accession by 2-digit ISIC industries
(average values, 2006-2012). SOE-dominated Sector is a dummy scoring one if an industry at
the 4-digit has more than 40% of workers employed in SOEs.
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Figure A2: Bias toward SOEs.
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Figure A3: Types of bias toward SOEs.
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Figure A4: POE vs. SOE: the effect of MFN tariff cuts on firm’s exit
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Note: The predictions are plotted from column 3 in Table 2 including the interaction term
between a dummy of foreign firms and MFN Tariff Cut. OLS regression with industry (4-digit)
fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the level of the firm. The histogram shows
the distribution of ∆τ . 95% C.I.
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Figure A5: POE vs. SOE: the effect of 1999 MFN tariff cuts on firm’s exit
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Note: The predictions are plotted from column 3 in Table 2 replacing ∆τ with 1999 MFN Tariff
Cut. OLS regression with industry (4-digit) fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at
the level of the firm. The histogram shows the distribution of 1999 MFN Tariff Cut. 95% C.I.
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Figure A6: POE vs. SOEs: The effect of MFN tariff cuts on firm profitability
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Note: The predictions are plotted from column 6 in Table 3 including the interaction term
between a dummy of foreign firms and MFN Tariff Cut. Fractional outcome regression with
industry (4-digit) fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The
histogram shows the distribution of ∆τ . 95% C.I.
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Figure A7: POE vs. SOEs: The effect of MFN tariff cuts on firm profitability (s.e. clustered by
industry).
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Note: Fractional outcome regression with industry (4-digit) fixed effects and robust standard
errors clustered at the industry level. The histogram shows the distribution of ∆τ . 95% C.I.
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Figure A8: POE vs. SOEs: The effect of MFN tariff cuts on firm profitability (s.e. clustered by
industry-year).
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Note: Fractional outcome regression with industry (4-digit) fixed effects and robust standard
errors clustered at the industry-year level. The histogram shows the distribution of ∆τ . 95%
C.I.
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Figure A9: POE vs. SOEs: The effect of MFN tariff cuts on firm profitability (with PSM)
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Note: The predictions are plotted from column 1 in Table A21. OLS regression with PSM and
industry (4-digit) fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the level of the firm. The
histogram shows the distribution of 1999 MFN Tariff Cut. 95% C.I.
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Figure A10: POE vs. SOEs: The effect of 1999 MFN tariff cuts on firm profitability
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Note: The predictions are plotted from column 3 in Table 3 replacing ∆τ with 1999 MFN Tariff
Cut. OLS regression with industry (4-digit) fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at
the level of the firm. The histogram shows the distribution of 1999 MFN Tariff Cut. 95% C.I.
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Figure A11: POE vs. SOEs: The effect of input tariff cuts on firm profitability
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Note: The predictions are plotted from column 3 in Table A23. OLS regression with industry
(4-digit) fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the level of the firm. The histogram
shows the distribution of MFN Tariff Cut. 95% C.I.
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Figure A12: Distribution of SOE Labor Share
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Figure A13: The effect of MFN tariff cuts on firm profitability, excluding interest payments
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Note: The predictions are plotted from a model specification similar to column 3 in Table 3.
However, the outcome variable is firm profitability excluding interest payments rather than
firm profitability including interest payments. The figure is very similar to Figure 6 to which
it should be compared. Fractional outcome regression with industry (4-digit) fixed effects and
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The histogram shows the distribution of ∆τ .
95% C.I.
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Table A1: Differences between POEs covariates and SOEs covariates.
Variable Mean Variance Skewness Mean Variance Skewness
ln(Labour) 2.88 1.73 1.05 4.81 2.59 -0.03
ln(Assets) 8.34 2.91 0.43 10.62 3.68 -0.30
MFN Tariff 10.91 56.99 1.51 13.00 73.46 1.54
ln(Exports) 9.40 90.56 0.07 12.89 84.76 -0.65
ln(K/L) 5.40 1.70 -0.69 5.76 2.12 -0.20
PTA Tariff 0.01 0.14 27.78 0.02 0.21 21.81
Age 41 811 -0.60 55 190 -2.68
Age squared 2529 3563003 -0.46 3216 1071655 -1.80
Variable Mean Variance Skewness Mean Variance Skewness
ln(Labour) 2.88 1.73 1.05 2.88 1.97 -0.03
ln(Assets) 8.34 2.91 0.43 8.34 4.91 -0.30
MFN Tariff 10.91 56.99 1.51 10.91 56.10 1.54
ln(Exports) 9.40 90.56 0.07 9.40 95.62 -0.65
ln(K/L) 5.40 1.70 -0.69 5.40 2.97 -0.20
PTA Tariff 0.01 0.14 27.78 0.01 0.14 21.81
Age 41 811 -0.60 41 811 -2.68
Age squared 2529 3563003 -0.46 2529 3549747 -0.51
POE SOE
POE SOE
Note: Results from entropy balancing. The top panel reports descriptive statistics pre-balancing,
whereas the bottom panel reports descriptive statistics post-balancing. After using entropy
balancing, the difference in means between POE and SOE is never significant.
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Table A2: Explaining MFN tariff cuts.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MFN Tariff Cut (lagged) -0.534*** -0.533*** -0.535*** -0.612***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.040)
TFPR 0.333 0.409 0.203 0.295
(0.469) (0.574) (0.404) (0.375)
Firm Profitability 0.011 0.011 0.073 0.001
(0.033) (0.033) (0.103) (0.002)
SOE dominated -0.154 -0.179 -1.005 -0.391
(1.121) (1.110) (1.462) (3.504)
Firm Debt 1.398
(1.477)
TFPR*SOE dominated -0.573
(1.266)
Firm Profitability*SOE dominated -0.227
(0.311)
Firm Debt*SOE dominated -0.912
(9.538)
Number of Employees -0.089 -0.092 -0.051 -0.019
(0.293) (0.296) (0.245) (0.164)
POE Exit Rate 0.254 0.239 0.113 0.778
(0.985) (0.989) (0.989) (1.495)
SOE Exit rate 2.668 2.435 3.004 24.204
(1.642) (1.563) (1.827) (27.104)
Capital-labor Ratio 0.154 0.156 0.144 0.038
(0.202) (0.203) (0.208) (0.221)
Age 0.134* 0.131* 0.123* -0.032
(0.077) (0.077) (0.067) (0.030)
HHI 0.690 0.697 0.466 -0.287
(1.838) (1.855) (1.552) (1.100)
Export -0.042 -0.042 -0.035 -0.013
(0.062) (0.062) (0.054) (0.046)
Constant 6.393*** 6.427*** 6.448*** 9.015***
(2.032) (2.062) (2.004) (1.729)
Observations 629 629 629 455
R-squared 0.474 0.474 0.487 0.697
Number of industries 117 117 117 107
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Yaer FE YES YES YES YES
OLS
MFN Tariff Cut
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS with industry (4-digit) fixed effects and robust standard errors by HS
4-digit. The outcome variable is MFN Tariff Cut.
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Exit 0.07 0.25 0 1
MFN Tariff Cut 1.37 1.43 -28.82 34.89
POE*Post-WTO 0.78 0.42 0 1
POE 0.91 0.29 0 1
Foreign firm 0.07 0.25 0 1
TFP 0.04 1.69 -15.40 12.50
ln(Markup) 0.34 0.96 0.01 0.99
HHI 0.06 0.12 0 1
ln(Number of Employees) 3.05 1.46 0 11.46
ln(Assets) 8.54 1.84 0 19.35
ln(K\L) 5.43 1.32 0 13.74
ln(Exports) 9.72 9.54 0 21.74
Age 6 6 0 67
Age squared 71 235 0 4489
Preferential Tariff Cut 0.01 0.38 0 20
MFN Tariff Cut (1999) 11.10 7.67 0 91.39
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
TFP -0.16 0.50 -2.13 1.41
ln(Markup) 0.26 0.47 0.01 0.82
MFN Tariff Cut 1.27 4.77 -28.82 34.89
SOE Revenue Share 0.11 0.19 0 1
ln(Number of Employees) 5.55 1.17 1.60 10.30
ln(K\L) 5.80 0.83 0 9.11
Exit 30.00 94.00 0 924
Age 50.00 7.00 1 69
ln(Exports) 10.74 9.38 0 21.74
Capital owned by state 3.89 5.80 0 35.08
Number of SOEs 9 19 0 224
Number of Semi-POE 223 500 0 5046.00
Number of POEs 393 906 1 8048
Number of Foreign Firms 29 88 0 927
MFN Tariff Cut (1999) 9.98 11.08 0 91.39
Firm-level analysis
Industry-level analysis
Note: The top panel reports descriptive statistics of the firm-level analysis, the
bottom panel reports descriptive statistics of the industry-level analysis, .
62
Table A4: Exit and MFN Tariff Cut.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POE 0.050*** 0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(0.007) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015)
MFN Tariff Cut -0.002*** -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.002 -0.002***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut 0.002*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant -0.062*** -0.078*** 0.818*** 2.481** 1.085*** -164.809***
(0.005) (0.016) (0.106) (1.018) (0.060) (13.163)
Observations 226,050 217,163 216,594 216,594 217,163 216,594 202,798
R-squared 0.038 0.203 0.451 0.451 0.460 0.457 0.436
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Business control NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Trends NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Firm FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
OLS
Pr(Exit=1)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regression with entropy balancing and standard errors clustered at the industry
level. The outcome variable is a dummy scoring one if firm exits the market in year t. The main
independent variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and POE.
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Table A5: Exit and MFN Tariff Cut.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POE 0.050*** 0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(0.005) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
MFN Tariff Cut -0.002*** -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.002 -0.002***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut 0.002*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.062*** -0.078*** 0.818*** 2.481*** 1.085***
(0.005) (0.017) (0.106) (0.734) (0.096)
Observations 226,050 217,163 216,594 216,594 217,163 216,594 202,798
R-squared 0.038 0.203 0.451 0.451 0.460 0.457 0.436
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Business control NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Trends NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Firm FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
OLS
Pr(Exit=1)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regression with entropy balancing and standard errors clustered at the industry-year
level. The outcome variable is a dummy scoring one if firm exits the market in year t. The main
independent variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and POE.
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Table A6: Exit and MFN Tariff Cut.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POE 0.050*** 0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(0.007) (0.019) (0.017) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.004** -0.002 -0.002**
(0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut 0.002*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.009***0.009***0.009*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 226,041 217,155 216,586 216,586 216,586 216,586 202,798
R-squared 0.038 0.203 0.451 0.451 0.460 0.457 0.436
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Business control NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Trends NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Firm FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
OLS
Pr(Exit=1)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regression with entropy balancing and standard errors double-clustered at the
industry and firm level. The outcome variable is a dummy scoring one if firm exits the market
in year t. The main independent variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and POE.
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Table A7: Exit and Post-WTO.
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6)
POE 0.020*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.068***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Post-WTO 0.015*** 0.002 0.003* -0.022*** 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
POE*Post-WTO 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.024***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -0.015*** 0.049*** 0.047*** -2.067
(0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (137.991)
Observations 226,050 217,163 217,163 217,163 203,363
R-squared 0.037 0.096 0.096 0.098 0.429
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES YES YES
Business control NO NO YES NO NO
Trends NO NO NO YES NO
Firm FE NO NO NO NO YES
OLS
Pr(Exit=1)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regression with entropy balancing and standard errors clustered at the firm level.
The outcome variable is a dummy scoring one if firm exits the market in year t. The main
independent variable is the interaction between a dummy capturing the post-WTO accession
and POE.
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Table A8: Exit and MFN cut: Only POE vs Semi-POE.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Completely Private 0.064*** 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008
(0.003) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Partially State Owned 0.041*** 0.010 -0.021 -0.021 -0.020 -0.019
(0.003) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
MFN Tariff Cut -0.002*** -0.004* -0.001 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.002 -0.002**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Completely Private*MFN Tariff Cut 0.002*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Partially State Owned**MFN Tariff Cut 0.002*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.064*** -0.079*** 0.821*** 2.471*** 1.082*** -241.679
(0.002) (0.008) (0.050) (0.372) (0.122) (1,094.366)
Observations 226,050 217,163 216,594 216,594 217,163 216,594 202,798
R-squared 0.040 0.203 0.452 0.452 0.461 0.458 0.437
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES YES YES YES NO
Business control NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Trends NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Firm FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
OLS
Pr(Exit=1)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regression with entropy balancing and standard errors clustered at the firm level.
The outcome variable is a dummy scoring one if firm exits the market in year t. The main
independent variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and Only POE and between
MFN Tariff Cut and Semi-POE.
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Table A9: Exit and MFN cut: Only locall SOEs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POE 0.044*** -0.037 -0.091** -0.091** -0.087** -0.089**
(0.006) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.042)
MFN Tariff Cut -0.002*** -0.005** -0.001 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.002 -0.002**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut 0.002*** 0.017*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.002**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.063*** -0.064 0.587*** 2.338*** 0.669*** 0.723***
(0.007) (0.046) (0.063) (0.399) (0.045) (0.055)
Observations 222,812 213,990 213,429 213,429 213,990 213,429 199,616
R-squared 0.038 0.210 0.468 0.468 0.475 0.473 0.424
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES YES YES YES NO
Business control NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Trends NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Firm FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
OLS
Pr(Exit=1)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regression with entropy balancing and standard errors clustered at the firm level.
The outcome variable is a dummy scoring one if firm exits the market in year t. The main
independent variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and POE.
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Table A10: Exit and MFN cut: Only central SOEs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POE 0.052*** 0.020 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.003) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
MFN Tariff Cut -0.002*** -0.004* -0.001 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.002 -0.002**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut 0.002*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.062*** -0.078*** 0.820*** 2.505*** 1.081*** 1.110***
(0.002) (0.008) (0.050) (0.378) (0.119) (0.108)
Observations 225,452 216,572 216,003 216,003 216,572 216,003 202,202
R-squared 0.038 0.204 0.454 0.454 0.462 0.459 0.434
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES YES YES YES NO
Business control NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Trends NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Firm FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
OLS
Pr(Exit=1)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regression with entropy balancing and standard errors clustered at the firm level.
The outcome variable is a dummy scoring one if firm exits the market in year t. The main
independent variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and POE.
69
Table A11: Exit, MFN Tariff Cut, and Firm’s Debt.
(1) (2)
POE -0.702*** 0.370
(0.175) (0.249)
MFN Tariff Cut -0.027*** 0.052**
(0.010) (0.026)
Firm Debt 1.011***
(0.166)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut 0.040*** -0.068**
(0.009) (0.033)
POE*Firm Debt -0.286*
(0.160)
MFN Tariff Cut*Firm Debt -0.065***
(0.025)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut*Firm Debt 0.105***
(0.030)
Constant -12.711*** -4.585***
(1.173) (0.275)
Observations 216,594 128,119
Controls YES YES
Year FE YES YES
Industry FE YES YES
Weibull
Pr(Exit=1)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Weibull models with standard errors clustered at the firm level.
The outcome variable is a dummy scoring one if firm exits the market
in year t. In Model 1, the main independent variable is the interaction
between MFN Tariff Cut and POE. In Model 2, the main independent
variable is the interaction among MFN Tariff Cut, POE, and Firm
Debt.
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Table A12: Exit and MFN cut.
(1) (2)
POE 0.052*** 0.052***
(0.013) (0.013)
MFN Tariff Cut -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut 0.002* 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.075*** 0.674***
(0.028) (0.202)
Observations 209,904 209,904
R-squared 0.085 0.085
Controls YES YES
Industry FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
Balancing YES YES
Business control NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
OLS
Pr(Exit=1)
Note: OLS regression with propensity score matching and standard
errors clustered at the firm level. The outcome variable is a dummy
scoring one if firm exits the market in year t. The main independent
variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and POE.
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Table A13: Exit and MFN tariff cut.
(1)
OLS
Pr(Exit=1)
POE 0.009
(0.015)
MFN Tariff Cut -0.003***
(0.001)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut 0.008***
(0.001)
Constant 0.338***
(0.049)
Observations 217,163
R-squared 0.468
Controls YES
Controls*Post-WTO YES
Industry FE YES
Year FE YES
Balancing YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01
Note: OLS regression with entropy balancing and standard
errors clustered at the firm level. The outcome variable is a
dummy scoring one if firm exits the market in year t. The
main independent variable is the interaction between MFN
Tariff Cut and POE. Each control is interacted with the
post-WTO dummy.
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Table A14: Firm Profitability and MFN tariff cut.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
POE -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.042 -0.044*** -0.043***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.355) (0.010) (0.011)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 144,461 144,084 144,084 144,084 144,084 129,909
R-squared 0.176 0.204 0.204 0.253 0.218 0.641
Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing YES YES YES YES YES YES
Business control NO NO YES NO NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO YES NO NO
Trends NO NO NO NO YES NO
Firm FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
OLS
Firm Profitability
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regressions with entropy balancing and standard errors double-clustered at the in-
dustry and firm level. The outcome variable is firm profitability (measured as PCM). The main
independent variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and POE.
73
Table A15: Firm Profitability and MFN tariff cut.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POE -0.302*** -0.233* -0.341** -0.341** -0.373*** -0.013
(0.040) (0.135) (0.139) (0.139) (0.128) (0.008)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.002 0.003 0.013 0.013 0.022** 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.000)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut -0.008*** -0.013* -0.014** -0.014** -0.018** -0.001** -0.001*
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Profitability (lagged) 4.267*** 3.838*** 3.724*** 3.724*** 3.787*** 0.428*** 0.225***
(0.108) (0.258) (0.255) (0.255) (0.229) (0.030) (0.023)
Constant -3.518*** -3.656*** -3.179*** -3.088*** -3.349*** 0.032***
(0.132) (0.168) (0.196) (0.253) (0.341) (0.012)
Observations 64,018 63,757 63,589 63,589 63,589 63,589 56,481
R-squared 0.343 0.572
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES YES YES YES NO
Business control NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Trends NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Firm FE NO NO NO YES NO NO YES
FracReg OLS
Firm Profitability
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Fractional outcome regressions (columns 1-5) and OLS regressions (columns 6-7) with robust standard
errors clustered at the firm level. The outcome variable is firm profitability (measured as PCM). The main
independent variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and POE. All the models include the lagged
dependent variable.
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Table A16: Firm Profitability and MFN tariff cut:.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
POE -0.017*** -0.014 -0.010 -0.022 -0.014 -0.233
(0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.010) (11.217)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.000* 0.001 0.002 -0.046 0.005 -0.017
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.028) (0.014) (0.947)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut -0.000** -0.001** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.003*** 0.016
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.893)
Firm Profitability (lagged) 0.199*** 0.222*** 0.248*** 0.292*** 0.240*** 1.352
(0.019) (0.055) (0.055) (0.078) (0.064) (58.092)
Constant 0.064*** -0.126 0.000 42.228 0.000 0.000
(0.022) (0.404) (0.000) (85.657) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 64,018 63,757 63,589 63,589 63,589 63,589
Number of instruments 103 103 103 103 103 103
Number of groups 30,608 30,552 30,465 30,465 30,465 30,465
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES YES YES YES
Business control NO NO YES YES YES YES
Industry-year FE NO NO NO NO YES NO
Trends NO NO NO NO NO YES
GMM
Firm Profitability
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: GMM regressions with entropy balancing and standard errors clustered at the firm level.
The outcome variable is firm profitability (measured as PCM). The main independent variable is
the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and POE. All the models include the lagged dependent
variable.
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Table A17: Firm Profitability and MFN tariff cut.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut -0.000** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Constant -0.005*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.033*** 0.057
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.012) (4,442.783)
Observations 64,018 63,757 63,847 63,587 63,847 63,587 63,847 63,587 63,847 63,587
R-squared 0.002 0.003 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.019 0.041 0.013 0.029
Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Business control NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO
Trends NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
OLS
Firm Profitability (first differences)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regressions with entropy balancing and standard errors clustered at the firm level. The outcome variable is firm profitability
(measured as PCM). The main independent variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and POE. All models include
double-differenced variables.
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Table A18: Firm Profitability and MFN Tariff Cut: Only POE vs Semi-POE.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Completely Private -0.533*** -1.008*** -0.922*** -0.922*** -0.850*** -0.053***
(0.044) (0.232) (0.206) (0.206) (0.187) (0.017)
Partially State Owned -0.489*** -0.813*** -0.845*** -0.845*** -0.840*** -0.051***
(0.043) (0.173) (0.178) (0.178) (0.182) (0.015)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.001 -0.047** -0.031 -0.031 -0.011 -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.004) (0.000)
Completely Private*MFN Tariff Cut -0.003 -0.011 -0.023** -0.023** -0.023** -0.002*** -0.001*
(0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001)
Partially State Owned**MFN Tariff Cut -0.009*** -0.010 -0.017* -0.017* -0.015 -0.001 -0.001**
(0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.001) (0.000)
Constant -1.077*** -1.488*** -0.568 0.009 1.559***
(0.018) (0.171) (0.401) (0.367) (0.494)
Observations 144,479 140,425 140,055 140,055 140,055 140,055 125,746
R-squared 0.288 0.664
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES YES YES YES NO
Business control NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Trends NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Firm FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm Profitability
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
FracReg OLS
Note: Fractional outcome regressions (columns 1-5) and OLS regressions (columns 6-7) with robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level. The outcome variable is firm profitability (measured as PCM). The main independent
variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and Only POE and between MFN Tariff Cut and Semi-POE.
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Table A19: Firm Profitability and MFN cut: Only local SOE.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POE -0.433*** -0.214 -0.324 -0.358 -0.276 -0.013
(0.094) (0.277) (0.213) (0.222) (0.199) (0.013)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.001 -0.048 -0.025 -0.025 0.003 -0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.029) (0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.004) (0.000)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut -0.007*** -0.004 -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.031*** -0.002*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 141,937 137,918 137,556 137,556 137,556 137,556 123,236
R-squared 0.322 0.606
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES YES YES YES NO
Business control NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Trends NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Firm FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm Profitability
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
FracReg OLS
Note: Fractional outcome regressions (columns 1-5) and OLS regressions (columns 6-7) with robust standard
errors clustered at the firm level. The outcome variable is firm profitability (measured as PCM). The main
independent variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and POE.
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Table A20: Firm Profitability and MFN cut: Only central SOE.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POE -0.495*** -0.948*** -0.931*** -0.980*** -0.892*** -0.056***
(0.046) (0.209) (0.208) (0.224) (0.200) (0.017)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.002 -0.047** -0.029 -0.029 -0.009 -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.004) (0.000)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut -0.008*** -0.011 -0.020** -0.023** -0.019* -0.002** -0.001**
(0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000)
Constant -1.080*** -1.455*** -0.498 0.043 1.646***
(0.018) (0.165) (0.405) (0.371) (0.507)
Observations 144,012 139,964 139,594 139,594 139,594 139,594 125,281
R-squared 0.289 0.665
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES YES YES YES NO
Business control NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Trends NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Firm FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm Profitability
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
FracReg OLS
Note: Fractional outcome regressions (columns 1-5) and OLS regressions (columns 6-7) with
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The outcome variable is firm profitability
(measured as PCM). The main independent variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut
and POE.
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Table A21: Firm Profitability and MFN tariff cut.
(1) (2)
POE -0.213*** -0.213***
(0.057) (0.057)
MFN Tariff Cut -0.003 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut -0.004 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
Constant -1.840*** -1.708***
(0.132) (0.132)
Observations 140,285 140,285
R-squared
Controls YES YES
Industry FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
Balancing YES YES
Business control NO YES
FracReg
Firm Profitability
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Fractional outcome regressions with propensity score matching
and standard errors clustered at the firm level. The outcome variable is
firm profitability (measured as PCM). The main independent variable
is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and POE.
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Table A22: Firm Profitability and MFN tariff cut: fractional outcome regressions with controls in-
teracted with the post-WTO dummy, entropy balancing and standard errors clustered at the firm
level.
(1)
FracReg
Firm Profitability
POE -0.861***
(0.188)
MFN Tariff Cut -0.027**
(0.012)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut -0.019**
(0.009)
Constant -0.674**
(0.296)
Observations 140,425
Controls YES
Controls*Post-WTO YES
Industry FE YES
Year FE YES
Balancing YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
Note: Fractional outcome regression with entropy balancing and stan-
dard errors clustered at the firm level. The outcome variable is firm
profitability (measured as PCM). The main independent variable is the
interaction betweenMFN Tariff Cut and POE. Each control is interacted
with the post-WTO dummy.
Table A23: Firm Profitability and MFN tariff cut.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
POE -0.470*** -0.826*** -0.394*** -0.888*** -0.396*** -0.953*** -0.019*** -0.060**
(0.063) (0.254) (0.064) (0.249) (0.064) (0.245) (0.004) (0.025)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.001 -0.003 -0.000 0.015 -0.000 0.010 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.014) (0.005) (0.016) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Input Tariff Cut -0.025 0.128 -0.010 -0.579 -0.142 -0.127 -0.023 -0.087 0.019 -0.018
(0.319) (2.865) (0.315) (2.291) (0.434) (2.425) (0.027) (0.231) (0.024) (0.117)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut -0.004 -0.024** -0.007** -0.034*** -0.007* -0.031** -0.000 -0.002** -0.001*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.012) (0.004) (0.013) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
POE*Input Tariff Cut 1.070** 1.018 0.919** 1.322 0.892* 1.012 0.057* 0.182 -0.003 -0.059
(0.426) (2.766) (0.416) (2.191) (0.503) (2.264) (0.031) (0.230) (0.029) (0.114)
Constant -1.008*** -1.153*** -0.932*** -0.919*** -1.104*** -0.810* 0.270*** 0.314***
(0.027) (0.249) (0.051) (0.245) (0.090) (0.415) (0.007) (0.027)
Observations 65,724 65,720 65,496 65,496 65,496 65,496 65,496 65,496 57,932 57,932
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Business control NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO
Trends NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO
Firm FE YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
Firm Profitability
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
FracReg OLS
Note: Fractional outcome regressions (columns 1-5) and OLS regressions (columns 9-10) with robust standard errors clustered at the
firm level. The outcome variable is firm profitability (measured as PCM). The main independent variable is the interaction between
MFN Tariff Cut and POE. All the models include Input Tariff Cut and POE.
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Table A24: TFP, SOE-dominated sectors, and MFN tariff cut (industry-level).
(1) (2)
SOE-dominated -0.033 -0.033
(0.067) (0.067)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.011 0.011
(0.013) (0.013)
SOE-dominated*MFN Tariff Cut -0.028* -0.028*
(0.015) (0.015)
Constant -0.153 -0.460*
(0.144) (0.251)
Observations 478 478
R-squared 0.571 0.571
Controls YES YES
Industry FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
Balancing YES YES
Business control NO YES
OLS
TFPR (first differences)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regression with entropy balancing and standard errors clus-
tered by HS 4-digit. The outcome variable is firm productivity
(measured as TFPR). The main independent variable is the interaction
between MFN Tariff Cut and SOE-dominated Sectors. All models
include double-differenced variables.
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Table A25: TFP, SOE-dominated sectors, and MFN tariff cut (industry-level).
(1) (2) (3)
SOE-dominated 0.009 0.135 0.135
(0.061) (0.102) (0.102)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.001 0.009 0.009
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
SOE-dominated*MFN Tariff Cut -0.013** -0.018** -0.018**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
TFPR (lagged) 0.304*** -0.098 -0.098
(0.082) (0.104) (0.104)
Constant -0.026 0.207 0.411
(0.212) (0.750) (0.765)
Observations 480 480 480
R-squared 0.505 0.657 0.657
Controls YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES
Business control NO NO YES
OLS
TFPR
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regression with entropy balancing and standard errors clus-
tered by HS 4-digit. The outcome variable is firm productivity
(measured as TFPR). The main independent variable is the interaction
between MFN Tariff Cut and SOE-dominated Sectors. All models
include the lagged dependent variable.
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Table A26: TFP, SOE-dominated sectors, and MFN tariff cut (industry-level).
(1) (2) (3)
SOE-dominated 1.425 0.121 0.062
(0.897) (0.095) (0.391)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.005 0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
SOE-dominated*MFN Tariff Cut -0.010** -0.015*** -0.014***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
TFPR (lagged) 0.064 -0.165 -0.234*
(0.088) (0.131) (0.122)
Constant 0.000 0.000 1.187**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.602)
Observations 480 480 480
Number of isic3 95 95 95
Controls YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES
Business control NO NO YES
GMM
TFPR
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: GMM regression with entropy balancing and standard errors clustered
by HS 4-digit.. The outcome variable is firm productivity (measured as
TFPR). The main independent variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff
Cut and SOE-dominated Sectors. All models include the lagged dependent
variable.
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Table A27: TFP, SOE Labor Share, and MFN tariff cut (industry-level).
(1) (2) (3)
SOE-dominated (share) 0.566*** 0.566*** 0.601**
(0.197) (0.197) (0.246)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.014
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012)
SOE-dominated*MFN Tariff Cut -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.029*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.015)
Constant -0.252 -18.995** -1.058
(0.905) (8.266) (1.046)
Observations 620 620 620
R-squared 0.660 0.660 0.719
Controls YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Balancing YES YES YES
Business control NO YES NO
Trends NO NO YES
OLS
TFPR
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regression with entropy balancing and standard errors clustered by
HS 4-digit. The outcome variable is firm productivity (measured as TFPR).
The main independent variable is the interaction betweenMFN Tariff Cut and
SOE Labor Share.
86
Table A28: TFP, SOE-dominated sectors, and MFN tariff cut (industry-level).
(1)
OLS
TFPR
SOE-dominated 0.184**
(0.081)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.021***
(0.005)
SOE-dominated*MFN Tariff Cut -0.030***
(0.003)
Constant -1.054
(1.069)
Observations 620
R-squared 0.709
Controls YES
Controls*Post-WTO YES
Industry FE YES
Year FE YES
Balancing YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regression with entropy balancing and standard errors clus-
tered by HS 4-digit. The outcome variable is firm productivity
(measured as TFPR). The main independent variable is the interaction
between MFN Tariff Cut and SOE-dominated Sectors. Each control is
interacted with the post-WTO dummy.
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Table A29: TFP, SOE-dominated sectors, and MFN tariff cut (industry-level).
(1) (2)
SOE-dominated 0.171 0.171
(0.109) (0.109)
MFN Tariff Cut -0.001 -0.001
(0.010) (0.010)
SOE-dominated*MFN Tariff Cut -0.018* -0.018*
(0.009) (0.009)
Constant -0.374 -40.244
(0.865) (23.698)
Observations 109 109
R-squared 0.717 0.717
Controls YES YES
Industry FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
PSM YES YES
OLS
TFPR
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regression with propensity score matching and standard
errors clustered by HS 4-digit. The outcome variable is firm productivity
(measured as TFPR). The main independent variable is the interaction
between MFN Tariff Cut and SOE-dominated Sectors.
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Table A30: Exit, MFN tariff cuts, Market Concentration.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MFN Tariff Cut -0.000 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HHI 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.024***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
MFN Tariff Cut*HHI 0.003** 0.002* 0.002* 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.006 0.037*** 0.210** -20.012**
(0.004) (0.011) (0.094) (8.026)
Observations 99,339 96,668 96,668 96,668
R-squared 0.016 0.041 0.041 0.042
Controls NO YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Business control NO NO YES YES
Trends NO NO NO YES
OLS
Pr(Exit==1)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the firm level. The
outcome variable is a dummy scoring one if firm exits the market in year t.
The main independent variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut
and HHI. The sample includes only POEs.
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Table A31: Exit, MFN tariff cuts, Market Concentration.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
HHI 0.020 0.025 0.025 0.029
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
MFN Tariff Cut*HHI -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant -0.010 -0.009 0.511 -14.602
(0.006) (0.044) (0.348) (16.469)
Observations 2,150 2,116 2,116 2,116
R-squared 0.057 0.079 0.079 0.084
Controls NO YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Business control NO NO YES YES
Trends NO NO NO YES
OLS
Pr(Exit==1)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the firm level.
The outcome variable is a dummy scoring one if firm exits the market in
year t. The main independent variable is the interaction between MFN
Tariff Cut and HHI. The sample includes only SOEs.
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Table A32: POE vs. SOE: entry and MFN tariff cuts.
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6)
POE -0.004 -0.020 -0.020 -0.011 -0.018
(0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
MFN Tariff Cut -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.922*** 1.858*** -6.234*** 2.139*** -2.407
(0.009) (0.048) (0.393) (0.124) (234.023)
Observations 217,163 216,594 216,594 217,163 216,594
R-squared 0.290 0.497 0.497 0.511 0.506
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing YES YES YES YES YES
Business control NO NO YES NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO YES NO
Trends NO NO NO NO YES
OLS
Pr(Entry=1)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regressions with entropy balancing and standard errors clustered at the
firm level. The outcome variable is a dummy scoring one if firm entries the market
in year t. The main independent variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff
Cut and POE.
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Table A33: Exit, Firm Debt, and Interest Rate.
(1) (2)
Pr(Exit=1) Interest Rate
POE 0.053*** -0.004
(0.006) (0.002)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.002 -0.001***
(0.002) (0.0001)
Firm Debt 0.023
(0.015)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut -0.002 0.001***
(0.002) (0.0001)
POE*Firm Debt 0.054***
(0.015)
MFN Tariff Cut*Firm Debt -0.005
(0.003)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut*Firm Debt 0.008**
(0.003)
Constant 0.052* 0.0003
(0.028) (0.006)
Observations 128,119 78,737
R-squared 0.097 0.043
Controls YES YES
Industry FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
Balancing YES NO
Trends YES YES
OLS
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regressions with entropy balancing and standard errors clustered
at the firm level. In Model 1, the outcome variable is a dummy scoring one
if firm entries the market in year t and the main independent variable is the
interaction between MFN Tariff Cut, POE, and Firm Debt. In Model 2, the
outcome variable captures interest rate and the main independent variable is
the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and POE.
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Table A34: Firm profitability and MFN tariff cuts in industries with SOEs and POEs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POE -0.507*** -0.805*** -0.794*** -0.794*** -0.843*** -0.044***
(0.043) (0.184) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.015)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.002 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.002) (0.000)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut -0.008*** -0.019** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.022** -0.002*** -0.001***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000)
Constant -1.082*** -1.122*** -0.828*** -0.534*** 0.734 0.376***
(0.018) (0.151) (0.223) (0.196) (0.488) (0.033)
Observations 143,920 143,915 143,538 143,538 143,538 143,538 129,358
R-squared 0.219 0.645
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES YES YES YES NO
Business control NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Trends NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Firm FE YES NO NO NO NO NO YES
FracReg OLS
Firm Profitability
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Fractional outcome regressions (columns 1-5) and OLS regressions (columns 6-7) with robust standard
errors clustered at the firm level. The outcome variable is firm profitability (measured as PCM). The main
independent variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and POE. The sample excludes SOE-
dominated Sector.
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A4. Main Results Including Switching Firms
Table A35: POE vs. SOE: exit and MFN tariff cuts.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POE 0.050*** 0.026** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.029***
(0.003) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
MFN Tariff Cut -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003* -0.003** -0.003**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.053*** -0.058*** 0.086 0.423 0.165** 0.163**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.066) (0.263) (0.075) (0.081)
Observations 240,354 227,775 227,775 227,775 227,775 227,775 227,775
R-squared 0.038 0.043 0.095 0.095 0.104 0.104 0.204
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Business control NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Trends NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Firm FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
OLS
Pr(Exit=1)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the firm level. The outcome variable is a
dummy scoring one if firm exits the market in year t. The main independent variable is the interaction
between MFN Tariff Cut and POE. The sample includes firms that switch from POEs to SOEs and
vice versa.
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Table A36: POE vs. SOE: Firm profitability and MFN tariff cuts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POE -0.156*** 0.059 -0.044 -0.044 -0.078 -0.018
(0.048) (0.099) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.018)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.010 0.032** 0.022* 0.022* 0.015 0.003 0.003
(0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003)
POE*MFN Tariff Cut -0.011 -0.042*** -0.031** -0.031** -0.024** -0.005* -0.005*
(0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant -0.211* -0.418** -1.214*** -1.288*** -1.051*** 48.547
(0.123) (0.204) (0.249) (0.255) (0.255) (35.502)
Observations 67,210 67,209 67,209 67,209 67,209 67,209 67,209
R-squared 0.247 0.317
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Business control NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Industry-year FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Trends NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Firm FE YES NO NO NO NO NO YES
FracReg OLS
Firm Profitability
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Fractional outcome regressions (columns 1-5) and OLS regressions (columns 6-7) with robust
standard errors clustered at the firm level. The outcome variable is firm profitability (measured as
PCM). The main independent variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and POE. The
sample includes firms that switch from POEs to SOEs and vice versa.
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Table A37: TFPR, MFN tariff cuts, and SOE-dominated Sectors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SOE dominated 0.067 0.122 0.122 0.126 0.057 0.057
(0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.058) (0.058)
MFN Tariff Cut 0.007* 0.010 0.010 0.007** 0.013* 0.013*
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
SOE dominated*MFN Tariff Cut -0.011** -0.016** -0.016** -0.011** -0.020** -0.020**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
Constant -0.558 0.073 -19.594*** -0.611 -0.160** -0.301
(0.331) (0.762) (6.097) (0.847) (0.073) (0.199)
Observations 632 632 632 632 632 632
R-squared 0.368 0.594 0.594 0.649 0.416 0.416
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balancing YES YES YES YES YES YES
Business control NO YES NO NO NO NO
Trends NO NO YES NO NO YES
OLS
TFPR Olley&Pakes
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by HS 4-digit The outcome variables are TFPR
and Olley & Pakes. The main independent variable is the interaction between MFN Tariff Cut and
SOE-dominated Sector. The sample includes firms that switch from POEs to SOEs and vice versa.
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